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Executive Summary 
Through the creation of the OAU/AU and ASEAN, the recently inde-
pendent states of Africa and Southeast Asia strengthened the ‘defence’ 
of their newly acquired sovereignty by developing norms of non-
intervention and regional security. By doing so, the member states es-
sentially shifted the discourse on security from the national to the re-
gional levels. After the Cold War, human rights came to take a larger 
place in international security discourse. To avoid external interfer-
ence in regional affairs under the pretext of human rights (an explicit 
concern in both AU and ASEAN), the regional organizations needed 
to devise normative frameworks for action and avoid perceptions that 
they were unable to deal with problems in their own backyard. 
 
In Africa, the willingness of member states to legislate beyond their 
capacity to implement contributed to the OAU establishing a regional 
human rights charter as early as 1987. With the creation of the AU in 
2002, human rights considerations were embedded into the security 
architecture of the organization. The inclination to assert regional pri-
macy became complicated when the response of the AU fell short of 
global standards embedded in the wider international community or in 
regional economic communities like ECOWAS. The AU’s tendency 
to favour political engagement and dialogue aimed at negotiated set-
tlements, with human rights considerations largely playing a second-
ary role, has created tensions with external as well as internal actors 
(the UN system, traditional powers, sub-regional institutions and 
emerging powers). In Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, the AU was not able to 
withstand external pressure and was ultimately bypassed by these ac-
tors. The AU’s primacy over continental affairs has thus become 
threatened both from the top (global institutions, traditional powers) 
and from below (sub-regional institutions and emerging powers that 
question the primacy of the AU). The overlapping membership of all 
AU member states in the UN and numerous sub-regional organiza-
tions further fuels this dynamic. 
 
When only the outcomes are analysed, critics might argue that AU 
responses to specific conflict situations have not changed since the 
OAU days. However, as the Constitutive Act and the many political 
interventions by the AU in Africa have shown, non-interference is no 
longer sanctified. The need to assert primacy at the regional level has 
opened up space for a stronger emphasis on human rights principles, 
from individual member states as well as sub-regional groupings, even 
if the original impetus of many member states was to strengthen non-
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intervention. Whether this will eventually affect the outcomes of AU 
responses hinges largely on the political will to draw closer links be-
tween AU’s security architecture and the African human rights archi-
tecture. 
 
In Southeast Asia, political diversity led to an ‘ASEAN way’ of low-
est-common-denominator approaches and the tendency to legislate 
behind implementation capacity. In recent years, ASEAN has been 
developing into a more robust regional institution, where the devel-
opment of a human rights architecture is seen as necessary in order to 
assert primacy on all aspects of regional relations. The ambitious 
‘ASEAN Community’ plan has spurred new institutional structures, 
including the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) and a human rights declaration. As yet, however, 
these developments are in their early stages and are still largely guided 
by older institutional practices of closed-door negotiations, security 
and non-interference. 
 
The Southeast Asian case studies on Myanmar and southern Thailand 
similarly illustrate ASEAN’s inclination to keep conflict management 
at the regional level. Due to the specific features of the organization, 
particularly its historical role as an inter-governmental association, 
ASEAN has been less willing to interfere in intrastate conflict than the 
AU. The continued emphasis on non-interference obstructs ASEAN 
and its member states from responding to regional crises, politically 
and on human rights grounds. In ASEAN, primacy over regional af-
fairs is thus mainly threatened by external actors (the UN system, tra-
ditional powers) as there is no continental institution that could inter-
vene within ASEAN states. Moreover, the member states are few and, 
though politically diverse, committed to maintaining ASEAN – and its 
institutional norms – at the centre of their foreign policies. In the case 
of Myanmar, ASEAN’s response would have followed non-
interference norms had it not been for external pressure, which led 
member states to reassess their response. That conclusion is strength-
ened by the case of southern Thailand, which can illustrate the posi-
tion ASEAN would take in the absence of pressure – its preferred de-
fault posture of deferring internal issues to the member state, regard-
less of the state’s role in exacerbating conflict. 
 
The tensions that arise when balancing human rights and security con-
cerns in these situations are not unique to AU and ASEAN. Rather, 
they are a regular – albeit not necessarily inevitable – consequence of 
weighing concerns for stability against the rights of individuals. If the 
AU and member states cannot find a meaningful way of addressing 
these tensions, through existing legislation, institutions and political 
mechanisms, they are likely to face similar challenges when respond-
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ing to future conflict situations characterized by human rights viola-
tions. Under such circumstances, the legitimacy and credibility of the 
AU may be further questioned – not only by the international commu-
nity, but also by member states. Indeed, the AU might find itself by-
passed by other actors. By contrast, the nature of conflict in Southeast 
Asia is less acute, more structural in nature and more subdued. This 
heightens the threshold for external interference in ASEAN’s respons-
es – or lack of such – to regional conflict situations. In the develop-
ment of stronger human rights architecture, old practices still create 
impasses and slow down the processes, but the rise of democratic 
member states, Indonesia in particular, may create promising dynam-
ics in the future. 
 
For policy recommendations, see the complementing NUPI Policy 
Briefs: 
No. 6 Linking Regional Security and Human Rights in the AU, 2012 
No. 7 Linking Regional Security and Human Rights in ASEAN, 2012   
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Introduction  
Over the past decade, the African Union (AU) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have taken notable steps towards 
internalizing and promoting human rights as international norms with-
in their regional organizations. The AU Constitutive Act (2000) calls 
for ‘Respect of democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance; [and] Promotion of social justice’ (Article 4(m, 
n)), while the ASEAN Charter (2007) require member states to adhere 
‘to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government; [and] respect for fundamental freedoms, 
the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of 
social justice;’ (Article 2(h, i)). In the AU, the institutionalization of 
human rights norms represents a significant shift from the approach 
taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU’s prede-
cessor, where human rights were deemed sovereign matters and left to 
the discretion of individual member states. Similarly, in ASEAN the 
institutionalization of human rights norms constituted a shift from the 
previous stance in what was termed the ‘Asian values’ debate, where-
in human rights were framed in relativistic terms. 
 
From their beginnings, both organizations served to promote and pro-
tect the sovereignty and security of their member states, with human 
rights playing a secondary role. As one author has noted, these 
‘[r]egional organisations were founded not as instruments for convey-
ance and enforcement of international directives or ideas, but rather as 
[...] bulwarks of local politics against external forces.’1 Intended pri-
marily to serve as security-oriented safeguards against external inter-
ference, the AU and ASEAN held separate clusters of institutional 
norms relating to member-state behaviour. In the OAU this took the 
form of anti-colonial struggles, and the promotion of decolonization 
and regional solidarity, while in ASEAN the Vietnam War and post-
colonial conflict was a major concern in region security considera-
tions. Regional security discourses thus elevated the Westphalian con-
cepts of non-interference and sovereignty to the regional level, with 
the development of corresponding maxims like ‘African solutions to 
African challenges’ or ‘the ASEAN Way’. 
 
                                                 
1  Alden, C. (2010) "'A Pariah in Our Midst': Regional organizations and the problematic of 
Western-designated pariah regimes – the case of SADC/Zimbabwe and ASEAN/ 
Myanmar". Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper. London: Destin Development 
Studies Institute.  
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After the Cold War, ‘human security’ and human rights entered into 
global discourses on peace and security. The OAU/AU and ASEAN 
came to consider human rights within their own security discourse and 
organizational raison d’être, but these were still largely framed within 
the existing state-centric security discourse. By emphasizing greater 
responsibility for human rights at the regional level, member states 
sought to avoid external interference from outside the region. 
 
The inclusion of human rights in the mandates of the AU and ASEAN 
required significant adjustments to the existing human rights and secu-
rity architectures. Human rights are fundamentally concerned with the 
relationship between states and their populace, placing these in tension 
with traditional interpretations of the concepts of non-interference and 
sovereignty. The transformation from the OAU to the AU in the early 
2000s and the resultant development of the African Peace and Securi-
ty Architecture (APSA) sought to address this challenge. In ASEAN, 
this was manifested in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 
and the resultant establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). 
Relevance of the report 
International norms are understood contextually and are thus applied 
unevenly in different regions. As guidelines for appropriate conduct 
for the member states of a given community like the AU or ASEAN, 
they evolve at different levels, based on the prevailing political reali-
ties and in response to specific circumstances. While both the AU and 
ASEAN have sought to elevate their role in the maintenance of re-
gional security and in the promotion of human rights, both organiza-
tions have struggled to articulate how member states should address 
tensions that arise between their human rights and security architec-
tures. Particularly in instances where human rights violations are ele-
vated to regional or global security concerns, the AU and ASEAN 
have struggled to maintain their position as primary actors within their 
regions. In Africa, interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011 
significantly affected perceptions of how the organization should re-
spond to grave violations of human rights within member states, and 
highlighting gaps within its human rights and security frameworks. In 
Southeast Asia, long-standing challenges in southern Thailand and 
Myanmar have resulted in divergent responses from regional actors, 
highlighting similar challenges. Where human rights violations and 
regional security concerns have coincided, both the AU and ASEAN 
have struggled to maintain their legitimacy as primary actors within 
their regions. 
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The role and impact of regional organizations in global governance – 
especially those situated in the global South – is often neglected, or 
measured in terms of what they fail to achieve rather than what they 
actually do. This report examines processes and practices for develop-
ing a comprehensive understanding of institutional dynamics. Thus it 
deals with questions of global governance, institutional development 
and legitimacy that have emerged from the tensions between regional 
human rights and security norms in two significant regional organiza-
tions. It investigates the AU’s and ASEAN’s developing human rights 
and security architectures to gain insight into the normative frame-
works established by these organizations to govern the behaviour of 
their member states and fend off external interference in their regions. 
 
The key question is how regional human rights architectures (the sum 
of norms and institutions) within the AU and ASEAN impact on re-
gional security discourse and practice. To this end, the report analyses 
the manner and degree to which human rights norms have impacted 
on decision-making and the formulation of regional responses to hu-
man rights violations in four cases: Myanmar, southern Thailand, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Libya. The report identifies how the AU and ASEAN 
member states have managed the emerging nexus between regional 
human rights and security norms in response to conflict situations in-
volving wide-spread human rights abuses. The study investigates 
where tensions arose, how these were managed and reconciled, and 
how both organizations sought to maintain their centrality and legiti-
macy as regional actors. 
 
On a cautionary note, we acknowledge that ASEAN and the AU are 
not directly comparable. The AU is a continental organization: 
ASEAN is a sub-regional one. They differ in institutional structure 
and working methods, but one objective remains strikingly similar – 
to assert themselves as the primary actor and interlocutor of the region 
and ward against external interference, be it in the ambit of security, 
human rights or other areas of engagement. The fact that there exists 
no larger Asian regional institution above ASEAN and the fact that it 
sits at the centre of most of the Asian security architecture allows a 
useful comparison to be made for the purposes of this study. We do 
not compare the two organizations directly, as in terms of institutional 
structure or physical similarities, but in terms of how they manage the 
emerging nexus between human rights and security and the tensions 
that arise when these two corresponding normative architectures come 
into play in responses to conflict situations characterized by wide-
spread human rights abuses. 
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Main argument 
Through the creation of the OAU/AU and ASEAN, the recently inde-
pendent states of Africa and Southeast Asia strengthened the ‘defence’ 
of their newly acquired sovereignty by developing norms of non-
intervention and regional security. These norms were promoted and 
defended at the collective regional level by newly established regional 
or sub-regional organizations. By doing so, the member states essen-
tially shifted the discourse on security from the national to the region-
al levels. This was possible in an era where security was understood as 
state security, where interstate conflict was perceived as the major 
threat, and where sovereignty was understood as a right – not a duty – 
of states. After the Cold War, this changed as human rights came to 
take a larger place in international security discourse. Post-Cold War 
conflicts increasingly defined the responsibility for external actors, 
particularly the responsible regional organizations, to intervene in 
humanitarian crises involving wide-spread human rights abuses. To 
avoid external interference in regional affairs under the pretext of hu-
man rights (an explicit concern in both AU and ASEAN), the regional 
organizations needed to devise normative frameworks for action and 
avoid perceptions that their organizations were unable to deal with 
problems in their own backyard. 
 
In Africa, the willingness of member states to legislate beyond their 
capacity to implement contributed to the OAU establishing a regional 
human rights charter as early as 1987. With the creation of the AU in 
2002, human rights considerations were embedded into the security 
architecture of the organization. In practice however, few links were 
drawn to the existing African human rights architecture, which con-
sisted of the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights and 
the African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The case studies 
presented here show that the inclination to assert regional primacy be-
came complicated when the response of the AU fell short of global 
standards embedded in the wider international community or in re-
gional economic communities like ECOWAS. The AU’s tendency to 
favour political engagement and dialogue aimed at negotiated settle-
ments, with human rights considerations largely playing a secondary 
role, has created tensions with external as well as internal actors (the 
UN system, traditional powers, sub-regional institutions and emerging 
powers). In Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, the AU was not able to withstand 
external pressure and was ultimately bypassed by these actors. The 
AU’s primacy over continental affairs has thus become threatened 
both from the top (global institutions, traditional powers) and from 
below (sub-regional institutions and emerging powers that question 
the primacy of the AU). The overlapping membership of all AU 
member states in the UN and numerous sub-regional organizations 
further fuels this dynamic. 
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When only the outcomes are analysed, critics might argue that it is not 
immediately evident that the original OAU dynamics in AU responses 
to specific conflict situations have changed. However, as the many 
political interventions by the AU in Africa and the AU Constitutive 
Act today have shown, non-interference is no longer sanctified. The 
need to assert primacy at the regional level has opened up space for a 
stronger emphasis on human rights principles, from individual mem-
ber states as well as sub-regional groupings, even if the original impe-
tus of many member states was to strengthen non-intervention. 
Whether this will eventually affect the outcomes of AU responses 
hinges largely on the political will to draw closer links between AU’s 
security architecture and the African human rights architecture. 
 
In Southeast Asia, political diversity led to an ‘ASEAN way’ of low-
est-common-denominator approaches and the tendency to legislate 
behind implementation capacity. In recent years, ASEAN has been 
developing into a more robust regional institution, where the devel-
opment of a human rights architecture is seen as necessary in order to 
assert primacy on all aspects of regional relations. The ambitious 
‘ASEAN Community’ plan has spurred new institutional structures, 
including the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) and a human rights declaration. As yet, however, 
these developments are in their early stages and are still largely guided 
by older institutional practices of closed-door negotiations, security 
and non-interference. 
 
The Southeast Asian case studies on Myanmar and southern Thailand 
similarly illustrate ASEAN’s inclination to keep conflict management 
at the regional level. Due to the specific features of the organization, 
particularly its historical role as an inter-governmental association, 
ASEAN has been less willing to interfere in intrastate conflict than the 
AU. The continued emphasis on non-interference obstructs ASEAN 
and its member states from responding to regional crises, politically 
and on human rights grounds. In ASEAN, primacy over regional af-
fairs is thus mainly threatened by external actors (the UN system, tra-
ditional powers) as there is no continental institution that could inter-
vene within ASEAN states. Moreover, the member states are few and, 
though politically diverse, are committed to maintaining ASEAN – 
and its institutional norms – at the centre of their foreign policies. In 
the case of Myanmar, ASEAN’s response would have followed non-
interference norms had it not been for external pressure, which led 
member states to reassess their response. That conclusion is strength-
ened by the case of southern Thailand, which can illustrate the posi-
tion ASEAN would take in the absence of pressure – its preferred de-
fault posture of deferring internal issues to the member state, regard-
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less of the state’s role in exacerbating conflict – much like a ‘control 
case’.  
Method and Structure 
The report is based on interviews with practitioners, policy-makers 
and researchers from civil society, academia and government, working 
in and with the AU and ASEAN, in addition to policy documents, 
print media, reports and academic texts. Interviews were conducted in 
Addis Ababa, Singapore, Jakarta and Bangkok between November 
2011 and January 2012. To ensure an open and confidential atmos-
phere in the interviews, informant requests of anonymity have been 
respected. 
 
The report first presents the development of the human rights and se-
curity architectures in the AU, highlighting where potential discrepan-
cies exist and tensions may arise in the nexus between the security and 
human rights architectures. It then goes on to analyse the AU’s most 
recent responses to the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, two crises 
in which the regional human rights and security architectures were 
clearly in tension with one another. We then turn to ASEAN and the 
development of its security and human rights architectures, before 
similarly analysing the organization’s responses to on-going conflicts 
in Myanmar and southern Thailand. Through all four case studies, we 
investigate where tensions arose (at the institutional level and among 
member states), how these were reconciled, and how both organiza-
tions sought to maintain their legitimacy as primary regional actors 
when responding to such crises. The study concludes with observa-
tions and recommendations for how the AU and ASEAN mighty work 
to bridge the gaps between their human rights and security architec-
tures and address future tensions. 
    
The AU: the Nexus between the Human 
Rights and Security Architectures 
Both the AU and ASEAN were formed primarily as regional security 
arrangements in the context of Cold War geopolitics, ostensibly as 
regional safeguards against external interference. However, in the AU 
context, the human rights architecture – which was established under 
the auspices of the OAU and which still functions as Africa’s conti-
nental human rights architecture today – preceded the security archi-
tecture that was established with the transition from the OAU to the 
AU, and through the creation of the African Peace and Security Archi-
tecture (APSA). Our analysis of the AU will follow the chronology of 
developments, while exploring the nexus between these two norma-
tive architectures. 
Developing a Regional Human Rights Architecture 
Since the 1960s, the importance of human rights has been increasingly 
acknowledged on the African continent, and human rights norms have 
become codified and entrenched at both the continental and sub-
regional levels. Given this level of institutionalization, it could be ar-
gued that the AU has gone further, most notably in its legislative 
framework, than any other regional or sub-regional body in articulat-
ing the link between human rights and security, and in asserting the 
role of the regional community in protecting its citizens from gross 
violations of human rights.2 
 
However, the continental human rights architecture, and therefore the 
manner in which the AU deals with human rights violations commit-
ted within the territories of member states has remained heavily influ-
enced by the normative frameworks that underpinned the workings of 
the OAU. Founded in 1963, the OAU was established primarily to 
promote the interests and security (understood in the traditional state-
centric sense) of its member states during decolonization and while 
Cold War politics dominated security thinking on the continent. Key 
in this regard was the anti-colonial struggle and efforts to contain the 
influence of foreign powers. Regional security discourses thus elevat-
ed Westphalian concepts of non-interference and sovereignty, where 
                                                 
2  The African Union (2000) "Constitutive Act". Addis Ababa: African Union. calls for 
‘Respect of democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; 
[and] Promotion of social justice’ (Article 4(m, n)). 
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they became entrenched and reinforced.3 The OAU Charter paid scant 
attention to human rights, save for provisions on self-determination, in 
the context of decolonization, and condemnation of apartheid in South 
Africa. Threats to human rights were conceptually understood as ema-
nating from outside the continent, and could best be addressed through 
African solidarity.4 With concepts of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of member states and the sovereign equality of states deemed 
inviolable, human rights concerns were viewed largely as domestic 
affairs and not as the business of the OAU. Member states were most-
ly left to deal with human rights concerns as they saw fit.5  
 
The dominant view was that the OAU should work to preserve and 
defend the new national borders established through decolonization, 
and to foster a sense of nationalism within each state. This understand-
ing later became enshrined in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, and was 
reinforced through membership in the UN. States were to be given a 
free hand to address domestic matters whilst they sought to find their 
place in an international order dominated by sovereign states. Howev-
er, stark contradictions were soon to emerge within the work of the 
OAU.  
 
Whereas the organization had been created to articulate and defend the 
values of the liberation movements across the continent and to pro-
mote African democratization and development, its emphasis on state 
sovereignty and non-intervention meant that the organization could 
neither uphold nor advance those values. As one observer notes, it be-
came increasingly clear that the central tenets of the OAU’s security 
culture were contradictory, or at least provided considerable scope for 
rival interpretations in particular settings.6 It was the resolution of the-
se contradictions that would eventually spur the further development 
of the AU’s security culture.  
 
Of particular importance were the OAU’s stance on secession, non-
interference and African autonomy. Where human rights violations 
could not be ignored, the OAU papered over them by considering hu-
man rights largely in connection with self-determination or the end of 
colonial rule. Problematic, for example, was the OAU’s willingness to 
criticize the internal affairs of some states, like the minority regimes in 
                                                 
3  Alden, C. (2010) "'A Pariah in Our Midst': Regional organizations and the problematic of 
Western-designated pariah regimes - the case of SADC/Zimbabwe and 
ASEAN/Myanmar". Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper. London: Destin 
Development Studies Institute. p. 20. 
4  Article 2(1) and 2(2), The OAU charter sought to “preclude external intervention in Afri-
can affairs” Naldi, G. J. (1999) The Organization of African Unity: an analysis of its role: 
Mansell. p. 3-4. 
5  Organization of African Unity (1963) "Constitutive Charter".  
6  Williams, P. D. (2007b) "From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins and 
development of the African Union's security culture". African Affairs 106 (423): 253–279. 
p. 266. 
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South Africa and Rhodesia, while remaining silent on large-scale hu-
man rights violations in others.7 This selective posture on non-
intervention underscored, as John Akokpari argues, the raison d’être 
of the organization, dedicated as it was to hastening the decolonization 
process in Africa and to protecting the territorial integrity of states ra-
ther than the individual and collective rights of African citizens.8  
 
The first human rights declaration for the African continent came in 
1969 through the adoption of the Convention Governing Specific As-
pects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which entered into force in 1974. 
However, the Convention was largely ignored at the time, and did not 
impact significantly on how the OAU approached human rights con-
cerns, specifically concerns related to cross-border displacement dur-
ing times of conflict. The 1970s witnessed the proliferation of regimes 
that were anything but human-rights respecting, but the OAU re-
mained silent. Worse still, as the chairmanship of the OAU was rota-
tional, many of these leaders also came to chair the organization at 
some point in time during their rule.  
 
The Cold War dynamics further served to ensure that no external pres-
sure was placed on the regimes or on the OAU. Indeed, where com-
placent regimes were in place, the West and the Soviet Union dis-
played no inclination to criticize human rights abuses, and continued 
to provide the resources necessary for regimes to remain in power. It 
was thus with the direct support of the USA that Mobutu Sese Seko in 
Zaire and Samuel Doe in Liberia were able to suppress internal dissent 
routinely, and most often violently.9 The political will to criticize such 
actions did not exist in the OAU at the time, and when states might 
have felt inclined to criticize others, this was often quickly suppressed 
through fear of counter-accusations of human rights violations, since 
that hardly any African country could lay claim to a positive human 
rights record during this time.10  
 
Yet already by the 1970s, fundamental changes began to take shape, 
hastened perhaps by the demise of strongmen like Amin in Uganda, 
Bokassa in the Central African Republic and Nguema in Equatorial 
Guinea. Amin’s abuses made it onto the OAU agenda in 1975, when 
the heads of state of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia 
refused to attend the organization’s annual summit in Kampala, citing 
                                                 
7  Ibid. p. 268. 
8  Akokpari, J. (2008) "Introduction: Human Rights Actors and Institutions in Africa". In 
Akokpari and Zimbler (eds) Africa’s Human Rights Architecture. Auckland Park: Fanele. 
p. 2. 
9  Ibid. p. 1-2. 
10  Sarkin, J. (2008) "Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect in Africa". 
In Akokpari and Zimbler (eds) Africa's human rights architecture. Auckland Park, South 
Africa: Fanele. p. 45-46. 
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Amin’s ‘disregard for the sanctity of life’ as the reason.11 Amin was 
nevertheless elected to the Chair of the OAU, and served out his term 
– a decision that would later return to haunt the organization. When 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni took the floor for his maiden 
speech to the Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government at 
the OAU summit in 1986, he accused the organization of condoning 
the wholesale massacre of Ugandans by Amin, under the guise of non-
interference in the affairs of member states.12 
Institutionalizing Human Rights in the OAU 
In 1981 the OAU moved to reinforce its stance on the promotion and 
protection of human rights, adopting the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter: African Charter). It provided for the 
establishment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) as a supervisory body for the promotion and protec-
tion of the rights set out in the Charter. Following ratification of the 
Charter in 1986, the Commission was established in Banjul, the Gam-
bia, in 1987, composed of 11 human rights experts. The Commission 
was charged with interpreting the Charter, and protecting and promot-
ing human and people’s rights under a mandate to collect documents, 
undertake research, organize seminars, disseminate information, col-
laborate with relevant organizations, lay down principles and give 
recommendations to governments.  
 
Some commentators hailed the African Charter as a progressive doc-
ument that recognized the indivisibility of civil and political rights, 
including economic, social and cultural rights, as distinct from other 
international human rights treaties. Others, however, criticized it for 
its many shortcomings, including ‘claw-back’ clauses which made 
certain rights subject to domestic law. Paramount among the criticisms 
was the non-binding nature of the decisions of the African Commis-
sion, and the failure of member states to implement its recommenda-
tions when these were generated. The OAU was also criticized for 
failing to monitor the implementation of the recommendations in its 
member states.13 
 
The African Charter was followed in rapid succession by a range of 
other human rights frameworks for the African continent, including 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted in 
                                                 
11  Williams, P. D. (2007a) "From non-intervention to non-indifference: the origins and 
development of the African Union's security culture". Afr Aff (Lond) 106 (423): 253-279. 
p. 269. 
12  Kioko, B. (2003) "The Right of Intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: 
From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention". International Review of the Red Cross 852. 
p. 813.  
13  Motala, A. (2008) The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Origins and 
Prospects, Auckland Park, South Africa: Fanele. p. 272-273. 
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1990, entry into force 1999), the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (adopted 
in 2003, entry into force 2005) and the African Union Convention for 
the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (adopt-
ed in 2009, not yet entered into force).  
 
The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation 
in Africa (CSSDCA), launched in Kampala in 1991, has been seen as 
a first attempt at articulating a new definition of security in Africa that 
would decouple security and sovereignty from one another. The Con-
ference set out core values that African governments were expected to 
uphold, including the acceptance of the central character of security 
which, as a multidimensional phenomenon, was defined as transcend-
ing military considerations and encompassing all aspects of human 
existence, including economic, political and social dimensions of the 
lives of individuals, the family, community and the nation.14 Im-
portantly, the CSSDCA articulated the first notion of what would later 
come to be known as the concept of ‘human security’, preceding even 
the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, often credited with hav-
ing concretized the concept. Despite initially resisting engagement 
with the CSSDCA, the OAU relented, and in July 1999 the process 
was endorsed by the OAU summit in Algiers.15 
 
The agreement in July 1988 to create an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the African Court) to complement and reinforce the 
remit of the ACHPR further strengthened the regional human rights 
architecture. In an attempt to better link the work of the ACHPR and 
the Court with the work of the OAU Secretariat, the Grand Bay Decla-
ration and Plan of Action and the Algiers Declaration were adopted in 
1999, with the latter recognizing shortcomings in the implementation 
of the regional human rights architecture and articulating the OAU’s 
commitment to transcend these. Simultaneously, the Algiers Declara-
tion (1999) called upon the international community to ‘ensure that 
[human rights] are not used for political purposes’, articulating the 
prevailing fear in the OAU that human rights abuses could become 
politicized and utilized to justify external intervention in African af-
fairs. 
                                                 
14  Mwanasali, M. (2008) "From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging 
Doctrine of Conflict Prevention in Africa". In Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba, Murithi and 
Centre for Conflict (eds) The African union and its institutions. Auckland Park, South 
Africa: Fanele. p. 49. 
15  Hutchful, E. (2008) "From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging Doctrine 
of Conflict Prevention in Africa". In Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba, Murithi and Centre for 
Conflict (eds) The African union and its institutions. Auckland Park, South Africa: 
Fanele. p. 76. 
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Entrenching Human Rights in the African Union 
The transition from the OAU to the AU in 2002 brought renewed im-
petus to strengthen the regional human rights architecture, and firmer 
human rights provisions were embedded in the Constitutive Act of the 
AU. However, a concern has been that provisions – even those that are 
legally binding – lack enforcement mechanisms that can motivate im-
plementation. 
 
The establishment of a functioning court to rule on human rights is-
sues has been riddled with delays. In preparation for the establishment 
of the African Court on the basis of the 1999 Protocol, the AU As-
sembly of Heads of State and Government in 2004 agreed to merge 
the African Court with the proposed African Court of Justice provided 
for in the AU Constitutive Act, so as to form the African Court of Jus-
tice and Human Rights (hereafter the Permanent Court).16 Following 
12 years of delay, the African Court came into being in 2006, when 
the first set of judges were appointed and the Court commenced its 
operations from Arusha, Tanzania. The Protocol to establish the Afri-
can Court of Justice was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 
2009. Efforts to merge both institutions into the Permanent Court with 
two chambers, one for general legal matters and one for human rights 
treaties, have been even slower.17 For the foreseeable future, the Afri-
can Court will remain the ultimate guardian of the African Charter, 
until such a time when the Permanent Court is established. 
 
The restriction on the admission of cases to the African Court have 
recently been somewhat softened through an innovative move by the 
Court and the ACHPR.18 If violations of the African Charter have oc-
curred, the ACHPR, member states, African inter-governmental or-
ganizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even indi-
viduals may now submit cases directly to the Court. The Protocol of 
the African Court also contains a mechanism allowing states to permit 
individuals and NGOs to initiate cases against them.19 Of the 24 states 
that have ratified the Protocol to date, six – Mali, Burkina Faso, Tan-
zania, Ghana, Malawi and most recently Rwanda (April 2012) – have 
entered into the necessary declaration allowing for such cases to be 
initiated.20 However, a revision of court procedures effectively argues 
                                                 
16  Sceats, S. (2009) "Africa’s New Human Rights Court: Whistling in the Wind?". Chatham 
House briefing paper. London: Chatham House. p. 5. 
17  As of June 2010, 21 states had signed the Protocol, but only two of 15 necessary states 
had ratified it. 
18  The new Rules of the Court replace the Interim Rules of Procedure of 20 June2008, fol-
lowing the harmonization of the Interim Rules of the Court and the Commission. 
19  OAU (1998) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and People's Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU 
Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III). art 34(6) 
20 For cases to be admissible before this Court, individual and NGO applicants must show 
that they have exhausted local remedies, or explain why this would take an inordinate 
amount of time. 
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that, because the African Court is an extension of the African Charter, 
ratification of the Charter is regarded as sufficient acceptance of the 
competence of the Court. Where grave violations of human rights oc-
cur, the ACHPR can now submit a case directly to the African Court. 
In addition, non-implementation of ACHPR recommendations on in-
dividual communications by member states can now be followed up 
through referral by the ACHPR to the African Court.21 The Court is in 
turn empowered to order provisional measures in cases of extreme 
gravity and ACHPR urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable 
harm to persons. Such measures must be implemented by member 
states and the AU Commission.22 
 
In addition, member states are now required to submit to the ACHPR 
reports every two years, on legislative and other measures they have 
taken to implement the Charter. The ACHPR can also receive com-
plaints from member states, and has developed a mechanism whereby 
individuals and NGOs may make submissions in cases where member 
states violate the Charter.23 The ACHPR also undertakes visits and 
fact-finding missions under its promotional and its protective man-
date. To date, it has been difficult to establish a modicum of con-
sistency in the priorities set by the ACHPR, but practice seems to 
show that the gravity of the situation and lobbying by NGOs are im-
portant factors.24 
 
As indicated above, a regional human rights architecture was estab-
lished first under the auspices of the OAU in 1981, and then continued 
by the AU after 2002. The transformation from the OAU to the AU 
brought with it renewed efforts to bolster and strengthen the regional 
human rights architecture, in particular through the establishment of 
the African Court, and the 2004 decision to merge the African Court 
and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights into the Perma-
nent Court. Importantly, the Constitutive Act of the AU contained 
numerous human rights provisions, and elevated human rights viola-
tions to the status of regional peace and security concerns. 
There exist several other legal documents related to, but not explicitly 
addressing, the linkage between human rights and regional security, 
including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Govern-
ance which entered into force in February 2012. The document stipu-
lates possible sanctions against states that fail to respect its principles. 
                                                 
21  In line with Rule 118 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 
22  Under Article 27 (2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, and Rule 51 or the Court Rules.   
23  Articles 47-59. 
24  The Commission has to date visited Togo, Sudan, Senegal, Nigeria, Mauritania, Darfur 
and Zimbabwe. See Murray, R. (2008) "Evidence and Fact-finding by the African 
Commission". In Evans and Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights : The System in Practice, 1986-2006, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 139–170. p. 146. 
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However, when the cases presented in this report were being studied, 
the Charter had not entered into force, so it has not been accorded a 
larger role in our analysis. 
Developing a Regional Security Architecture25 
Debates around good governance, transparency, human rights and 
democratization intensified throughout the 1990s, increasingly linked 
to efforts aimed at conflict prevention on the African continent. Dur-
ing the Harare Summit in June 1997 and again at the Algiers in July 
1999, debate among member states centred on whether the OAU 
should be vested with the right to intervene in the internal affairs of 
member states in order to protect human rights and constitutional or-
der. Increasingly, consensus was established that the original OAU 
concepts of sovereignty and non-interference should be revised in line 
with the view of sovereignty as responsibility.26 Following the Algiers 
Summit in July 1999, it was Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi who 
called for an extraordinary summit to discuss making the OAU more 
effective and relevant to the continent. After heated exchanges, lead-
ers agreed to a process that involved transitioning the OAU into the 
AU, negotiating a new Constitutive Act and strengthening the scope 
and mandate of the organization.27  
 
During the discussions leading up to the adoption of the Constitutive 
Act in July 2000, negotiating teams had reflected on the inadequacies 
of the OAU’s peace and security arrangements. They noted that the 
AU should work to ensure the protection of civilians in conflict situa-
tions, in particular as regards war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide – atrocities that had haunted the continent even through the 
1990s. It was also during the Lomé Summit that the OAU’s Panel on 
the Rwandan Genocide presented its report, which contained scathing 
criticism of the OAU, the UN and the international community at 
large. The release of the report focussed discussion in Lomé on two 
issues in particular; the authorization of interventions in situations 
where atrocities are committed; and the need to add the preservation 
of political stability as a legitimate reason for intervention, especially 
in post-conflict settings. It was decided that interventions conducted 
by the new AU in the most extreme of circumstances would need to 
be authorized at the highest political level, the Assembly of Heads of 
                                                 
Other mechanisms include the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
which is voluntary and the African Peer-Review Mechanism (APRM) which currently 
consists mainly of SADC members. 
26 Mwanasali, M. (2006) "Africa’s Responsibility to Protect". In Adebajo and Scanlon (eds) 
Dialogue of the Deaf – Essay on Africa and the United Nations. Auckland Park: Fanele. 
p. 90. 
27  Baimu, E. and K. Sturman (2003) "Amendment to the African Union’s Right to Intervene 
– A Shift from Human Security to Regime Security?". African Security Review 12 (2). p. 
38. 
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State and Government, and that the preservation of political stability 
constituted a legitimate reason for intervention.28  
 
When the AU was launched in 2002, the Constitutive Act reflected a 
far more interventionist peace and security architecture than that of its 
predecessor. According to Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act, a pri-
mary objective of the AU is to defend the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and independence of its member states – yet Article 3(f) clearly 
states that a further primary objective is the promotion of peace, secu-
rity and stability on the continent, while Article 3(h) mandates the AU 
to promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other relevant 
international human rights instruments. The principles by which the 
AU is to operate to reconcile these apparently contradictory objectives 
are laid out in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act. Article 4(a) upholds 
the sovereign equality and interdependence among member states, 
while Article 4(f) prohibits the use of force or threat of use of force 
among member states, and Article 4(g) prohibits member states from 
intervening in the affairs of one another. However, Article 4(h) pro-
vides the AU with the right to intervene in a member state in grave 
circumstances: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Article 4(j) further provides member states with the right to request 
the AU to restore peace and security in other member states. There-
fore, while the Constitutive Act prohibits member states from interfer-
ing in each other’s affairs, the Union is vested with full rights of inter-
vention on behalf of member states, once authorized by the Assembly. 
Article 4(m) mandates the AU to uphold respect for democratic prin-
ciples, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, while Arti-
cle 4(o) mandates the Union to respect the sanctity of human life, and 
to condemn and reject impunity, political assassination, acts of terror-
ism and subversive activities.29 
 
To operationalize this new interventionist security architecture, the 
first ordinary session of the AU Assembly established what is often 
referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 
On 9 July 2002, the AU member states adopted the Protocol Relating 
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, which set out the entry points, determined the modalities for 
action and identified the institutional arrangements that would support 
the work of the Council in the fulfilment of its responsibilities for con-
flict prevention and management in Africa. The Protocol established 
                                                 
28  This decision was incorporated into the Constitutive Act at the Maputo Summit in 2003. 
See Mwanasali, M. (2006) "Africa’s Responsibility to Protect". In Adebajo and Scanlon 
(eds) Dialogue of the Deaf – Essay on Africa and the United Nations. Auckland Park: 
Fanele. p. 92. 
29  African Union (2000) "Constitutive Act". Addis Ababa: African Union. Signed at Lomé, 
Togo. 11 July. 
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the Peace and Security Council (PSC), as well as its supporting struc-
tures. The PSC was intended to replace the defunct Central Organ of 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
established in 1993, and would be the central standing decision-
making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of con-
flicts, supported by collective arrangements to facilitate timely and 
efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. 
 
The effectiveness and credibility of AU response to conflict situations 
has often been challenged by the unclear division of labour between 
the AU and the level of the Regional Economic Communities (REC). 
The RECs are the building blocks of the African peace and security 
architecture, responsible for dealing with issues of peace and security 
within their respective regions.30 It is only when the RECs are unable 
to handle a conflict situation – or when they request the assistance of 
the AU – that the continental level of the APSA is to take over. Sever-
al of the regional mechanisms, particularly the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), have their own protocols with 
detailed provisions on how to act in the event of human rights viola-
tions or unconstitutional changes of government. In practice, the re-
gional and continental levels often work in parallel. However, dis-
crepancies between the normative standards embedded in the AU and 
the RECs complicate this – as in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, where 
ECOWAS came to play an important role. 
 
While several organs were mandated with a peace and security role,31 
the PSC was to be the primary political organ within the APSA, with 
decision-making responsibility for how the AU should respond to con-
flict situations on the continent. The PSC is vested with the authority 
to take initiatives and action deemed appropriate in response to poten-
tial or actual conflict situations, to impose sanctions on member states, 
to suspend member states in case of unconstitutional changes of gov-
ernment, and to authorize the deployment of peace support operations. 
The Council is further mandated to recommend to the AU Assembly 
authorization for intervention in cases of grave circumstances, includ-
ing war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide.32 Importantly, the decisions of the 15-member Council are to be 
                                                 
30  Currently there are eight RECs recognized by the AU, each established under a separate 
regional treaty: the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the 
East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergov-
ernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Southern Africa Development Com-
munity (SADC). 
31  Including the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council of the 
African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the Chairperson of the African Union Com-
mission, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Commit-
tee. 
32  Article 7 of the Protocol and art 4 (h) AU Constitutive Act. 
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binding on member states.33 In its work, the PSC can draw upon a 
range of declarations and treaties that draw the link between the 
maintenance of peace and security and the promotion and defence of 
human rights, including on democratic institutions and good govern-
ance. The Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Se-
curity Policy, for instance, acknowledges the ‘fundamental link and 
symbiotic relationship’ between security, stability, human security, 
development and cooperation, in a manner that allows each to rein-
force the other. 
 
When creating the APSA, the AU and member states were well aware 
that they were legislating beyond their own capacity to implement. 
However, the AU’s capacity has developed over time. To date, the 
Council has proved extremely active, addressing a range of conflict 
situations across the African continent and formulating innovative re-
sponses to complex conflict situations, at times individually and at 
times in unison with other international actors, the UN in particular. 
The AU has become increasingly adept at utilizing mediation and 
good offices on the one hand and the deployment of peace support op-
erations on the other, in dealing with conflict situations in Burundi, 
Sudan, the Comoros, Somalia, Madagascar, Mali, and Guinea Bissau 
among others. However, as the AU has come to play a more active 
and prominent – if not primary – role in the management of conflict 
situations within its region, tensions have increasingly emerged be-
tween the regional human rights and security architectures. While the-
se tensions were perhaps initially noticed in the AU’s response to the 
conflict in Darfur from 2004 onwards, they came starkly to the fore in 
2011, when the AU found itself responding to conflicts characterized 
by human rights violations first in Côte d’Ivoire and then in Libya, in 
rapid succession.  
Case Studies 
The following case studies illustrate the AU’s inclination to keep con-
flict management at the regional level and to avoid interference from 
actors outside the continent. However, this dynamic becomes compli-
cated when the AU response falls short of global standards embedded 
in the larger international community or in regional economic com-
munities like ECOWAS. Attempts by the continent-level human rights 
institutions, ACHPR and the African Court, to raise human rights con-
cerns were largely ignored and never entered the AU’s decision-
making process in a meaningful way. In Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, the 
                                                 
33  As of October 2011, the members of the PSC were Benin, Burundi, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauretania, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
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AU proved unable to withstand the pressure from external actors and 
was ultimately bypassed. 
Election Violence in Côte d´Ivoire 
Following decades of political – and intermittently violent – conflict, a 
four-year transition period brought about by the Ouagadougou Peace 
Agreement of 2007 set the stage for the Ivorian Presidential Elections 
of November 2010. The primary contenders were incumbent President 
Laurent Gbagbo, already in power for ten years, and his opposition 
challenger, Alassane Ouattara. 
 
While the second round of elections on 28 November proceeded in a 
relatively calm manner, tensions soon erupted when the Independent 
Electoral Commission declared Ouattara the winner of the elections. 
Incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to acknowledge the 
electoral results, and instead had the Constitutional Court swear him 
in as president once more. Ouattara and his entourage, based at a hotel 
in Abidjan, soon found themselves surrounded by a military blockade, 
and cut off from the rest of the world. 
 
In its initial meetings, the PSC was uncertain of how to act, and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s presence in the Council complicated its ability to develop a 
position.34 While the Council on 4 December urged all parties to re-
spect the outcomes of the presidential elections as proclaimed by the 
Independent Electoral Commission, it did not go much further in pro-
claiming itself. Instead, it was ECOWAS, on 7 December 2010, that 
first declared Ouattara the winner of the presidential election and sus-
pended Côte d’Ivoire from all decision-making in the organization un-
til a transfer of power had been effected. With the ECOWAS decision 
endorsed by the UN Security Council on 8 December, the PSC fol-
lowed suit, recognizing Ouattara as president-elect on 9 December and 
calling on Gbagbo to respect the results of the election and facilitate 
the transfer of power. The Council also suspended Côte d’Ivoire from 
all AU activities until such time as the transfer of power to Ouattara 
had been effected.35 
 
Initially, the AU, ECOWAS and the international community were 
working in parallel. Taking an uncharacteristically firm stance, the 
AU PSC was quick to call for a political solution to the crisis, and re-
quested the Security Council to fully support the efforts of ECOWAS 
and the AU in this regard. As the situation on the ground continued to 
                                                 
34   Côte d’Ivoire had commenced a two-year term on the Council on 1 April 2010, Lotze, W. 
(2011) "A Tale of Two Councils – The African Union, the United Nations and the 
Protection of Civilians in Côte d’Ivoire". Global Responsibility to Protect 3. p. 366. 
35  AU Peace and Security Council (2010) Communiqué of the 252nd Meeting og the Peace 
and Security Council PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLII), 9 December 2010, Addis Ababa.  
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worsen, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, together 
with the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, 
and the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Victor Gbeho, on 16 
December embarked on a whirlwind tour of Abuja and Abidjan, meet-
ing with ECOWAS stakeholders, notably Nigerian President Good-
luck Jonathan, and in Abidjan, with President Gbagbo and President-
elect Ouattara, in an effort to ease tensions and find a political solution 
to the increasingly tense stalemate.36 That same day, the ACHPR is-
sued a statement, expressing its concern at the unfolding situation, and 
deploring the loss of life and the violations being committed against 
the civilian population in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
As the crisis spilled into the early months of 2011, and Gbagbo re-
fused to hand over power, the positions of the AU, ECOWAS and the 
UN increasingly came to diverge.37 Whereas ECOWAS and the UN 
expressed concerns about the protection of civilians and the escalating 
human rights violations committed by the forces of Gbagbo as well as 
Ouattara, the AU viewed the conflict primarily from a political per-
spective, and kept calling for a negotiated solution. Interestingly, 
while the PSC did express civilian protection concerns in its decisions 
on Côte d’Ivoire, these were not made with the same sense of urgency 
within ECOWAS or the UN. Seeking to avoid military escalation, the 
Council met again on 28 January; it reminded the international com-
munity that Africa held primary responsibility for the management 
and resolution of the crisis, and established a High-Level Panel, 
chaired by Mauritanian President Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz and 
composed of the presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, Tanzania and 
South Africa as well as the Chairperson of the AU Commission, to 
find a negotiated settlement to the conflict.38 
 
The establishment of the panel and the election of panel members 
were controversial also within the AU. First, while the Council was to 
have been convened at the level of heads of state and government, it 
was in fact convened before all of these had arrived in Addis Ababa. 
Only the presidents of Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
were present, with the remaining delegations being represented at am-
bassadorial level.39 Second, although both South Africa and Nigeria 
had come to assume leading roles in resolving the crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire, South African President Jacob Zuma came to be on the pan-
                                                 
36  Lotze, W. (2011) "A Tale of Two Councils – The African Union, the United Nations and 
the Protection of Civilians in Côte d’Ivoire". Global Responsibility to Protect 3. p. 367. 
37  Ibid. p. 365-375. 
38  The High Level Panels established by the AU usually consist of representation from each 
of Africa’s five security regions. 
39  Personal interview 1 (2011). Addis Ababa. see also, AU Peace and Security Council 
(2011d) Communique: The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 
259th meeting held on 28 January 2011, at the level of the Heads of State and Govern-
ment, Addis Ababa: African Union.  
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el, but not Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan.40 This was in part 
related to Jonathan’s on-going efforts to be re-elected, but it also re-
flected the tensions that had been emerging between the AU and 
ECOWAS positions on how best to resolve the crisis, and the conti-
nent-level power politics at play. Finally, the decision proved contro-
versial, as the AU had decided to establish a panel to pursue a political 
process at a time when ECOWAS and the UN were deploring the 
grave violations in Côte d’Ivoire, and were pushing for more robust 
action to be undertaken to halt further atrocities. 
 
After some delays, the High-Level Panel finalized its recommenda-
tions on 9 March, and on 10 March the PSC met again to deliberate 
the recommendations. While strongly condemning the on-going at-
tacks against the civilian population and the atrocities, the Council re-
affirmed its decision that the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire required a political 
solution. Accordingly, the Council requested the Chairperson of the 
AU Commission to appoint a High Representative for implementation 
of the Panel’s recommendations, tasked with convening, under the 
auspices of the AU and ECOWAS, negotiations between the parties to 
the conflict and aimed at facilitating a political transition. The Coun-
cil, again seeking to assert African primacy as regards Côte d’Ivoire, 
requested the Chairperson to transmit its decision to the UN Security 
Council.41 On 15 March, Ouattara accepted the decisions of the PSC, 
and signalled his intent to participate in a process of political dialogue. 
On 17 March, however, Gbagbo’s cabinet issued a communiqué re-
jecting the decision of the Peace and Security Council. That same day, 
frustrated by the apparent failure of efforts aimed at achieving a polit-
ical way forward, and convinced that Gbagbo could not be coaxed into 
ceding power, Ouattara issued an ordinance to the former rebel forces 
of the Forces Nouvelle. Fighting immediately commenced in the west 
of the country between Ouattara’s forces and those forces loyal to 
Gbagbo. Within four days, Ouattara’s forces succeeded in capturing 
most of the country, and were approaching Abidjan. Gbagbo un-
leashed his own forces indiscriminately against those thought to be 
supporting Ouattara, as well as Africans from Mali and Burkina Faso. 
There were even attacks on personnel of the UN Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire, UNOCI, and, to a lesser extent, foreign embassies.42 
In light of the deteriorating situation, the ACHPR in March 2011 reit-
erated its concern about the political deadlock, and issued a resolution 
against the targeting of civilians by defence and security forces that 
had resulted in hundreds of deaths. The ACHPR also strongly con-
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demned the threats and attempts at intimidation directed against 
ONUCI, strongly opposed the deliberate obstruction of its mission, 
and further called on all parties to work towards restoration of peace 
and security.43 Despite its relatively strong stance, the ACHPR resolu-
tion was largely ignored by the AU and ECOWAS alike, and was not 
referred to again in later decisions on Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
As the AU refused to address the on-going human rights abuses in a 
more direct manner – arguing that only political negotiations could 
bring about a lasting solution to the crisis – it was bypassed by 
ECOWAS in its meeting on 23–24 March 2011. ECOWAS called on 
the UN Security Council to take measures to assist in bringing an end 
to the violence and to effect the transfer of power from Gbagbo to 
Ouattara.44 On 30 March the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1975, which condemned the serious and on-going 
abuses and violations of international law in Côte d’Ivoire, and reaf-
firmed the primary responsibility of states to protect their civilian 
populations. While calling for all parties to the conflict to seek a polit-
ical solution, as outlined by the AU Peace and Security Council, act-
ing under Chapter VII of the Charter gave full support to UNOCI, 
while impartially implementing its mandate, to use all means neces-
sary to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment.45 
The day after, Ouattara’s forces entered Abidjan. Simultaneously, 
UNOCI attack helicopters and Force Licorne infantry (French forces 
deployed to support the UN mission) engaged pro-Gbagbo forces, de-
stroying heavy weapons and seizing military and strategic installations 
in Abidjan. By 5 April, with offensive operations underway across the 
country and President Gbagbo swiftly losing control in Abidjan, the 
AU Peace and Security Council urged Gbagbo to cede power to Ouat-
tara immediately, to bring an end to the suffering of the Ivorian peo-
ple. The Council further encouraged UNOCI, within the framework of 
the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, to vigorously im-
plement its mandate to protect civilians.46 By 11 April, Gbagbo had 
been forced out of power – at a cost of between 50047 and 3,00048 ci-
vilians killed and 800,000 displaced, with countless atrocities having 
been committed on both sides. 
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Following the end of the armed conflict, the ACHPR planned to un-
dertake a fact-finding mission to Côte d’Ivoire, but was unable to do 
so independently due to lack of funding. In view of this shortcoming, 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) 
included the ACHPR Commissioner and Special Rapporteur, Reine 
Alapini-Gansou, on its team for a fact-finding mission to Côte 
d’Ivoire in May 2011.49 The mission was mandated to investigate the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of serious abuses 
and violations of human rights committed following the presidential 
election, in order to identify those responsible and bring them to jus-
tice. The inclusion of an ACHPR Commissioner in the fact-finding 
mission helped to bring in an African perspective and legitimize the 
role of the ACHPR. However, the conduct of an OHCHR as opposed 
to an ACHPR mission to Côte d’Ivoire inhibited the ability of the AU 
to integrate its human rights and security architectures in its future 
dealings with Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, while the PSC sent a group of 
diplomats and technical staff from the AU Commission to Côte 
d’Ivoire to gather views from the Ivorian authorities and other relevant 
stakeholders – and this team was tasked specifically with investigating 
human rights concerns – the ACHPR was not invited to take part in 
the mission. 
 
As has been shown above, the AU response to the crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire was dominated by a desire to find a political solution to the 
conflict. While human rights concerns did feature in the discourse of 
the Peace and Security Council and its subsequent decisions, these 
concerns were ancillary to concerns for regional stability. While 
ECOWAS and the UN initially supported the AU’s political approach, 
they quickly came to elevate human rights concerns over the need to 
find a political solution to the stalemate, thus adopting a more strongly 
interventionist approach to bring about an end to the conflict. The AU, 
on the other hand, continued to advocate for more time to be given to 
finding a political solution for Côte d’Ivoire throughout its engage-
ment, despite the escalation of grave atrocities. Further, whereas the 
security architecture of the AU was prioritized in the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire, the human rights architecture was generally marginalized in 
decision-making processes. Indeed, the role of the ACHPR proved 
marginal at best, and when the Commission did seek to play a role in 
addressing concerns related to the conflict, it was largely disregarded 
by other AU decision-making bodies. As will be seen below, despite 
greater activism on the part of the ACHPR and the African Court in 
the case of Libya, the outcomes basically the same. 
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Popular Uprising in Libya 
Following years of political isolation and economic decline, Libya 
from 1999 onwards came to re-engage with the international commu-
nity, and diplomatic and trade relations were established on an in-
creasing basis from the mid-2000s. Then Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi’s rising status in the international community came to an ab-
rupt end in early 2011 when, in the wake of the Arab Spring, protests 
erupted in eastern Libya. The reprisals sparked a more serious armed 
rebellion a month later, and the country rapidly descended into civil 
conflict. By mid-March, the government had launched a full offensive 
against the opposition, and Gaddafi vowed to crush not only the upris-
ing, but also the town and the citizens of Benghazi, which had rebelled 
against the Tripoli regime.  
 
The international community expressed growing unease at the Libyan 
government’s brutal clamp-down of the rebellion. On 22 February 
2011, the League of Arab States took a decisive move by suspending 
Libya’s membership. As the sub-region does not have a fully func-
tional REC, the AU was the default African organization to address 
the situation. The AU response was complicated by the fact that, as in 
the case of Côte d’Ivoire, Libya was a member of the Peace and Secu-
rity Council at the time of the conflict. Two core concerns overshad-
owed the decision-making of the Council: that Africa should retain 
primacy in the resolution of the conflict, and that Libyan sovereignty 
should not be violated. Therefore, in its meeting on 23 February, the 
Council both condemned the indiscriminate and excessive use of force 
and the use of lethal weapons against peaceful protesters, while rec-
ognizing the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people and at the 
same time condemning the transformation of pacific demonstrations 
into an armed rebellion against the Tripoli regime.50 
 
The AU’s security architecture was quickly activated to develop a po-
litical solution. Viewing the Libyan crisis primarily as a domestic mat-
ter, the Council rejected any foreign military intervention, and en-
dorsed an AU-developed roadmap for political resolution to the con-
flict. The roadmap called for the immediate cessation of all hostilities, 
the cooperation of the Libyan authorities in facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, the protection of foreign nationals including 
African migrants living in Libya, and the adoption and implementa-
tion of political reforms designed to address the root causes of the cri-
sis.51 The predicament of the African migrants in Libya, and the con-
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sequences for the Sahel region of an exodus of people and arms, were 
elevated as primary concerns for the AU.52  
 
Also the regional human rights architecture swiftly came to play an 
active role. In contrast to the PSC, the ACHPR and the African Court 
viewed the human rights violations being perpetrated in Libya as a 
primary concern; and instead of a political solution, advocated that 
measures be taken against Libya such abuses. Taking advantage of the 
newly established rules of procedure, three NGOs (the Egyptian Initia-
tive for Personal Rights, Human Rights Watch and Interrights) report-
ed Libya to the ACHPR. The Commission issued a statement on 25 
February 2011, expressing concern about ‘the serious and massive vi-
olations’ taking place in the country and urging the Libyan govern-
ment to put an immediate end to violence against the civilian popula-
tion. That same day, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolu-
tion condemning the gross and systematic violations of human rights 
taking place in the country, and called upon the Libyan government to 
meet its responsibility to protect its population.53 The following day, 
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, demanding an 
immediate end to the violence and establishing, among other 
measures, an arms embargo. Several regional organizations swiftly 
followed suit.54 
 
The AU, similar to its reaction to Côte d’Ivoire, dismissed discourse 
on military intervention and argued that an African-led political solu-
tion to the crisis was the only viable course of action. The AU ap-
proach, however, failed to garner much international support, and it 
was clear that the AU’s favoured approach would not serve to halt the 
atrocities in the short term. With the situation rapidly deteriorating, 
and with Gaddafi’s forces on the outskirts of Benghazi, the League of 
Arab States on 12 March requested the UN Security Council to estab-
lish a no-fly zone over Libya. In response to this request, the UN Se-
curity Council on 17 March 2011 adopted Resolution 1973, demand-
ing the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and an end to violence 
perpetrated against the civilian population; the Council imposed a no-
fly zone over Libya, and authorized all necessary means to protect ci-
vilians and civilian-populated areas other than through the deployment 
of a foreign occupation force.55 The three African members of the 
Council – Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon – all voted in favour of the 
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resolution, despite the AU PSC having previously rejected any foreign 
military intervention in the crisis.56 
 
According to the coalition of states participating in the operations, 
military action was to be restricted to the enforcement of UNSCR 
1973, but it soon became clear that NATO sought to topple the Gad-
dafi regime.57 The operations were initiated by a coalition of Western 
states joined by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, with all opera-
tions under NATO command.58 Airstrikes were limited to targets 
linked to the Gaddafi regime, and were conducted in support of armed 
movements which came to form the National Transitional Council 
(NTC), armed and supported by Western and Arab powers.59 
 
Receiving no response from Libya to its statement, the ACHPR in 
March 2011 moved to condemn the actions of the Libyan government 
and instituted proceedings in the African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights for ‘serious and massive violations of human rights guar-
anteed under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.60 
That same month, the Court, for the first time in its history, ordered 
provisional measures against a member state, requiring Libya to ‘im-
mediately refrain from any action that would result in loss of life or 
violation of physical integrity of persons, which could be a breach of 
the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights or 
of other international human rights instruments to which it is a par-
ty’.61 One of the elements cited in the African Court’s decision to or-
der provisional measures, was the response of international organiza-
tions, both universal and regional, of which Libya is a member. The 
ruling cited the decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council, the 
statements of the Secretary General of the Arab League, and UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1970.62 The Libyan delegate present during 
the Court’s session argued that Libya was prepared to cooperate with 
the African Court and implement the provisional measures. In its re-
sponse to the Court on 9 April 2011, the Libyan government denied 
the claims against it, but simultaneously expressed its willingness to 
subject itself to investigations by the Court. Subsequently, however, 
the Libyan government ignored the Court.  
                                                 
56  AU Peace and Security Council (2011f) PSC/AHG/ COMM.2 (CCLXV), 10 March, Ad-
dis Ababa: African Union.  
57  See for example, Obama, B., D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy (14 April 2011) "Libya’s Path-
way to Peace". New York Times.  
58  Initially, 10 states from Europe and the Middle East participated in the intervention, later 
expanding to 17. 
59  Jolly, D. and K. Fahim (2011) "France Says It Gave Arms to the Rebels in Libya". New 
York Times. New York. , Levinson, C. and M. Rosenberg (2011) "Egypt Said to Arm Li-
bya Rebels ". Wall Street Journal. New York.   
60  Dolidze, A. (2011) "African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – Response to the 
Situation in Libya". Insights 15 (20).  
61  Ibid.  
62  African Commission for People’s and Human’s Rights (2011a) ACHPR on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Application No. 
004/2011. Order for Provisional Measures., Banjul.  
38 Andreas Stensland, Walter Lotze and Joel Ng  
The report of the ACHPR and the verdict of the Court were subse-
quently placed on the agenda of the AU Summit in Malabo in July 
2011 for follow-up, although the ACHPR reportedly came under fire 
from several member states because it had openly criticized the Gad-
dafi government.63 As in previous situations, the ruling was not en-
dorsed by the AU Summit, and the matter was deferred through calls 
for further investigation.64 Notably, neither the report of the ACHPR 
nor the verdict of the Court was mentioned in the outcome document 
of the Summit.65 Despite this disconnect between the orders of the 
Court and the actions of AU member states, it is important to note 
that, for the first time in their history, the Commission and the Court 
had found that a member state was failing to protect its population, 
and had ordered measures to be taken against the member state on that 
basis. Further, although the report of the Commission and the decision 
of the Court did not impact on the manner in which the AU sought to 
deal with the Libyan crisis, it was noteworthy that NGOs gained ac-
cess to the African Court through the ACHPR in a case of grave viola-
tions of human rights.  
 
While the ACHPR and the African Court were proceeding with their 
actions against Libya, the Peace and Security Council established a 
High-Level Committee (HLC) on Libya mandated to engage with all 
parties to the conflict and assess the evolution of the situation on the 
ground. It sought to facilitate an inclusive dialogue among the Libyan 
parties on the appropriate reforms, and to engage AU partners, in par-
ticular the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), the EU and the UN, to coordinate efforts and seek 
their support for resolution of the crisis. 
 
At a relatively early stage, the AU emerged with a principled and ro-
bust approach to the crisis, but the special dynamics of the organiza-
tion’s political organs made the approach of the HLC static and poorly 
attentive to developments on the ground. The HLC visited Libya on 
10 and 11 April, meeting with both Gaddafi and the NTC to broker a 
ceasefire as a prerequisite for further negotiations. However, the NTC 
was unwilling to negotiate with Gaddafi and was generally distrustful 
of the AU, given Gaddafi’s prominent role in the creation and leader-
ship of the organization.66 
 
Disturbed, yet seeking to assert its primacy, the AU rejected the West-
ern-led Libya Contact Group and refused to attend the initial meetings 
hosted by the group in Paris and London, attempting instead to craft a 
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political solution independently. When this approach failed to gener-
ate meaningful results, the AU Deputy Chairperson finally travelled to 
the third meeting of the contact group in Istanbul. But the AU appear-
ed to be too late. A widely supported UN roadmap for the Libyan cri-
sis had already been developed, so there was now no support for the 
AU roadmap.67 By the time the AU was willing to engage with the in-
ternational community on the future of Libya, its concerns on foreign 
military intervention being utilized to bring about regime change had 
already rung true.68 Following seven months of conflict, and what was 
in effect a deadlock in the AU, Muammar Gaddafi was killed in Sirte 
on 20 October 2011, and the NTC was swiftly installed in Tripoli.  
 
By the time of the Malabo Summit in July 2011, the AU had lost the 
ability to promote a common position on Libya. Some member states, 
notably Ethiopia and Nigeria, pushed for a withdrawal of recognition 
for Gaddafi – but, on the advice of the HLC, Libya was not suspended 
from the organization. Concurrently, the recommendations of the 
ACHPR and the decisions of the African Court were sidelined, and the 
Summit adopted a decision that AU member states would not cooper-
ate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its proceedings 
against Gaddafi. While this latter decision was not widely endorsed, 
only Botswana and South Africa later stood forth and rejected the out-
comes of the Summit, stating that they would not cease their coopera-
tion with the ICC. Once again, member states sought to use the re-
gional organization as a shield against external interference in regional 
affairs. However, since consensus is required for enforcement of the 
decisions of the regional human rights mechanisms, the ACHPR and 
the African Court, no regional alternative to the ICC investigation 
emerged either. 
 
Thus, in responding to the conflict in Libya, the AU acted in a manner 
similar to the case of Côte d’Ivoire: it gave priority to its security ar-
chitecture, and promoted political engagement when human rights 
violations were rapidly escalating. In particular, at a time when mem-
bers of the international community were most concerned about the 
commission of atrocities, the AU failed to utilize its own human rights 
architecture in unison with its security architecture to deal with these 
concerns. Despite the more active role of the ACHPR and the African 
Court in the case of Libya, the recommendations of the Commission 
and the decisions of the Court were largely ignored by AU member 
states. 
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Observations 
Under the aegis of the AU, the regional human rights and security ar-
chitectures are closely linked, indeed mutually constitutive and rein-
forcing. However, a major discrepancy exists between the stated aspi-
rations of the continent’s leaders and their responses to conflict situa-
tions in practice. This may be a result of several factors. 
 
First, there is the discrepancy between the human rights and security 
architectures in the region. While the regional human rights architec-
ture governing the work of the AU was developed under the auspices 
of the OAU, the regional security architecture governing how the AU 
responds to conflict situations was developed under the newly estab-
lished AU, from 2002 onwards. Efforts have been made to align the 
human rights architecture to organizational changes undertaken over 
the course of the past decade, notably through linking the ACHPR to 
the African Court and in turn merging the African Court with the Af-
rican Court of Justice and Human Rights. However, no significant ef-
forts have been made to link these architectures with the APSA, or 
with decision-making in the AU through the Peace and Security 
Council or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Whereas 
the designated human rights actors, the ACHPR and the African 
Court, are nominally detached from member states, the PSC is an in-
herently political organ, led by member states. On the one hand this is 
positive, because it gives the Commission and the Court independence 
and legitimacy. On the other hand, it leaves the Commission and the 
Court with little direct power to enforce decisions. While violations of 
human rights have technically been elevated as a primary security 
concern for the region, the roles and responsibilities between decision-
making bodies and the procedures to be employed are not entirely 
clear, and regional human rights and security decision-making pro-
cesses have tended to bypass one another.69 
 
Second, and related to the above, the linkages are extremely weak be-
tween the AU Commission, which functions as the organization’s sec-
retariat, and the ACHPR and the African Court. While interaction 
does take place at the level of individuals,70 perhaps in part as a result 
of geographical separation (the AU Commission being located in Ad-
dis Ababa, the ACHPR in Banjul and the African Court in Arusha), 
there is no institutionalized interaction. Neither the ACHPR nor the 
AU Commission has permanent representation or liaison functions 
with one another. Neither does the ACHPR have a presence in Addis 
Ababa, the centre of political gravity on the African continent.71 Thus, 
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despite key AU documents highlighting the need for AU organs to 
seek close cooperation with the ACHPR and the African Court in mat-
ters relevant to their objectives and mandate,72 there is considerable 
concern that the ACHPR and the African Court are rarely invited to 
participate in AU activities. Both the AU Commission and the 
ACHPR have in the past highlighted the benefits of greater coopera-
tion and information-sharing, but the practical measures for doing so 
have not yet been established.73 As a result, political procedures 
geared for dealing with human rights abuses within member states are 
de-linked and stove-piped.  
 
Third, despite the prominent role accorded the ACHPR, it has been 
largely sidelined by AU member states, for political reasons. Whereas 
the ACHPR is a quasi-judicial body and can hear individual com-
plaints, its recommendations, unlike the decisions of the Court, are not 
binding: it is up to individual member states to implement recommen-
dations. Despite this shortcoming, the Commission is required to 
submit a report of its activities to each session of the AU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, giving its work more weight. To 
date, however, the reports of the ACHPR have not been made public 
until approved by the AU Assembly. For several years, the ACHPR’s 
reports were adopted without much scrutiny, which lessened their ef-
fectiveness.74 This modus operandi then changed, and the AU Assem-
bly routinely postponed the publication of reports that contained alle-
gations against member states. In 2008 the procedure changed once 
again – and, since then, no report of the ACHPR has been approved 
by the AU Assembly.75 The Commission, chronically under-
resourced, has had neither the means nor the political access to elevate 
this as a concern to AU member states.76 
Fourth, while the African Court has been provided with a broad remit 
to address human rights concerns and to take decisions that are bind-
ing on member states, the Court commenced operations only in 2006, 
and has not heard sufficient cases to assert its role vis-à-vis AU mem-
ber states or AU decision-making bodies. While its decisions regard-
ing Libya give an indication of the potential role which the Court can 
play, more time is required to determine whether the Court will be 
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able to enforce the powerful mandate it has been provided with. In ad-
dition, the planned merger of the Court with the African Court of Jus-
tice and Human Rights involves considerable unpredictability, and 
may further delay the institutionalization of an empowered human 
rights judicial body.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that while significant investment has been 
made in the development of the regional security architecture, no such 
investment has been made in the regional human rights architecture. 
This discrepancy is particularly evident at the level of the AU Com-
mission. While the Peace and Security Department is well-staffed and 
funded, the Political Affairs Department, which deals, inter alia, with 
human rights and humanitarian issues, is poorly staffed and re-
sourced.77 (At the time of writing, the Political Affairs Department 
had only one staff member tasked with human rights matters.) This 
imbalance in funding has resulted in sub-optimal coordination among 
the various departments in the AU Commission tasked with human 
rights and peace/security matters. An audit from 2007 generated simi-
lar findings when it described the relationship between the Chairper-
son, Deputy Chairperson, the Commissioners and the Directors of the 
AU Commission as ‘dysfunctional with overlapping portfolios, un-
clear authority and responsibility lines and expectations’.78  
 
Thus it seems clear that the human rights and security architectures of 
the AU, while mutually constitutive and reinforcing on paper, in reali-
ty remain largely divorced from one another. As shown by the cases 
of Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, this has resulted in tensions between the 
human rights and security architectures of the organization, and has 
impacted on the ability and the manner in which the AU has been able 
to deal with conflict situations characterized by human rights viola-
tions. This has in turn affected the legitimacy and credibility of the 
organization as well as its ability to assert itself as a primary actor in 
the domains of human rights as well as peace and security in the re-
gion. 
 
The tensions that arise when balancing human rights and security con-
cerns in response to crisis situations are not unique to the AU and 
ASEAN. They are a regular – albeit not necessarily inevitable – con-
sequence of weighing concerns for stability against the rights of indi-
viduals. However, if the AU and member states cannot find a mean-
ingful way of dealing with these tensions, through existing legislation, 
institutions and political mechanisms, the AU is likely to face similar 
                                                 
77  Donors are reluctant to fund the PAD unless it shows improvements in management and 
implementation. Personal interview 6 (2011). Addis Ababa.  
78  African Union (2007b) Audit of the African Union: Towards A People-Centred Political 
and Socio-economic Integration and Transformation of Africa Addis Ababa: African 
Union. p. 44. 
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challenges when responding to future conflict situations involving 
human rights violations. Under such circumstances, the AU’s legiti-
macy and credibility may be further questioned – not only by the in-
ternational community, but also by its own member states.  The AU 
may well find itself bypassed by other actors. 
 
 
ASEAN: the Nexus between the Human 
Rights and Security Architectures  
While ASEAN cannot be considered as robust a regional security or-
ganization as the AU and is sub-regional, the organization was never-
theless established primarily with regional security concerns in mind 
as a bulwark against external intervention in regional affairs.79 The 
development of a regional security architecture began only with the 
adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The inclusion in the Charter 
of the commitment to promote and protect human rights in the region 
was seen as ground-breaking and marked a decisive turn in the ‘Asian 
values’ debate. However, progress in institutional strengthening to 
create a framework for the protection of human rights has been con-
siderably slower. Our analysis of ASEAN institutional development 
below will follow the chronology of developments, exploring the nex-
us between the organization’s security and human rights architectures. 
Developing a Regional Security Architecture 
ASEAN was initially formed in 1967 with the ASEAN (Bangkok) 
Declaration signed by five countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil-
ippines, Singapore and Thailand, The Declaration contained just five 
articles, and emphasized growth, cooperation, and peace and stability 
as the basis of association.80 The organization served to promote and 
protect the sovereignty and security of its member states. One major 
concern at the formation of ASEAN in 1967 was the Vietnam War, 
and the organization later took a strong stance in opposition to the Vi-
etnamese invasion of Cambodia. The emphasis remained primarily on 
security, with declarations such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN, 1971). 
 
Institutionally, ASEAN remained relatively dormant until 1976, a year 
that saw the promulgation of two formative documents: the first Dec-
laration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC). ASEAN Concord I was the first regional attempt to define a 
common political, economic, and social agenda, while TAC created a 
legal document to bind security cooperation and establish a code of 
conduct. 
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Member states favoured a low pace of normative development, sub-
jecting legislation to political will and implementing capacity. Deci-
sions were made on the basis of consensus. A lowest-common-
denominator approach, known as the ‘ASEAN Way’ based on consul-
tation, inclusiveness, organizational minimalism, and the peaceful res-
olution of disputes, was taken to move agendas forward.81 Thus, 
ASEAN retained the informal characteristics as an intergovernmental 
organization, rather than a regional institution. At the same time, this 
elevated the importance of diplomatic engagement and compromise 
prior to any formal decision-making. As will be shown, institutional 
developments often took the form of declarations rather than formal 
treaties or complex institutional structures like those of the AU. 
 
Security discourses elevated the Westphalian concepts of non-
interference and sovereignty to the regional level, whereas human 
rights concerns were largely left to the discretion of member states. In 
the early 1990s, human rights were viewed with great scepticism and 
as a tool for external influence or even interference. It was against the 
backdrop of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 
1993 that ASEAN first committed to a common framework on human 
rights. In what became known as the Bangkok Declaration of 1993, 
Asian leaders accepted the universality of human rights, but also in-
serted significant qualifiers while giving priority to economic, social 
and cultural rights. In the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN mem-
bers typically emphasized ‘respect for national sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of 
States, and the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political 
pressure.’ Furthermore, the Declaration contained a caveat: ‘[human 
rights] must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving 
process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance 
of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds.’ A senior Singaporean foreign ministry 
official’s description of human rights as ‘an easy, cheap, and popular 
way to exercise influence or maintain the illusion of involvement’82 
indicates the prevailing mood in ASEAN at the time. 
 
As an alternative to the human rights agenda with the individual as the 
reference point, ASEAN members subscribed to the alternative ‘Asian 
Values’, which had the community as the reference point, emphasiz-
                                                 
81  Severino, R. (2001) "The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law". International Law 
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ing the right to development, to freedom from terrorism, etc..83 One of 
the primary sources of criticism from the West in this period was the 
detention of political prisoners in numerous Asian states. The Bang-
kok Declaration of 1993 noted that ‘terrorism in all its forms and man-
ifestations, as distinguished from the legitimate struggle of peoples 
under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation, has 
emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to the enjoyment of hu-
man rights and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and se-
curity of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted govern-
ments.’ In positing that ‘terrorists’ posed a threat to the enjoyment of 
human rights Asian states justified the derogation of certain individual 
rights under specific circumstances. 
 
The addition of less-developed Southeast Asian states was seen as 
necessary for regional security, yet also had an impact on ASEAN 
norms. Brunei joined upon independence in 1984, and Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (the ‘CLMV’ countries) joined the or-
ganization in the late 1990s. The need to define ASEAN norms took 
on greater urgency. Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar even-
tually outlined them in 1998 at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting 
in Manila as follows: 
 
 sovereign equality and decisions by consultation and consen-
sus; 
 non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 
 avoidance of the use of force to change established govern-
ments or an internationally recognized political order; 
 open economies;  
 making ASEAN the cornerstone of member states’ foreign pol-
icies.84 
 
Initiatives intended to nuance the strict focus on sovereignty and non-
interference emerged. At the same 1998 meeting, and concerned with 
the cross-border problems spilling over from Myanmar, then Thai 
Foreign Minister (now ASEAN Secretary-General) Surin Pitsuwan 
put forward a document titled Thailand’s Non-Paper on the Flexible 
Engagement Approach. The paper proposed that non-interference was 
valid, but that it was not absolute: ‘as the region becomes more inter-
dependent, the dividing line between domestic affairs on the one hand 
and external or trans-national issues on the other is less clear.’85 There 
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could be a constructive role for ASEAN in dealing with ‘domestic is-
sues with regional implications.’ However, this attempt at reframing 
non-interference was ultimately rejected in Manila, and a weaker al-
ternative nomenclature of ‘enhanced interaction’ was used.86 
 
As ASEAN grew, it became increasingly difficult to reach consensus 
on decisions, due not least to the disparity in levels of development 
between the older members and the CLMV countries. Informal solu-
tions such as ‘ASEAN minus X’ (meaning ASEAN less the dissenting 
members) would often be used to permit the development of economic 
arrangements without full consensus within the group. Somewhat par-
adoxically, however, under Article 21 of the ASEAN Charter, consen-
sus is required in order to proceed on the ‘ASEAN minus X’ princi-
ple.87 While the Charter does allow for an ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula, 
this is expressly limited to economic agreements. 
 
A separate trajectory was opened with the emergence of the ‘human 
security’ paradigm espoused by the UNDP in 1994. ASEAN arguably 
had prefigured the notion through its own conception of ‘comprehen-
sive security’ that included a range of ideas beyond traditional military 
security, such as economic development and political stability. In any 
case, human security encompassed a fully-developed scope for human 
rights and was methodologically focused on the individual, as opposed 
to the state or society– in contrast to ASEAN's comprehensive security 
concept that emphasized the primacy of the state or society.88  
 
Despite some developments, the debate over human security and the 
shaping of a regional human rights mechanism and discourse re-
mained fairly dormant in the aftermath of the East Asian financial cri-
sis of 1997/98. Vocal leaders of the Asian Values debate, like Ma-
hathir Mohamed of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, were 
retiring or taking lesser roles, but it was the overthrow of Suharto in 
Indonesia that had the most pronounced effect on the region. Indone-
sia turned democratic, withdrew from Timor-Leste and became an ac-
tive promoter of human rights regionally, even as it continued to be 
dogged by accusations of violations in conflict areas like Aceh and 
West Papua. 
 
ASEAN has been relatively successful at preventing interstate war, 
and security problems have tended to revolve around issues at the 
fringes.89 Unlike Africa, Asia lacks a continent-level body, and 
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Regional Security and Human Rights Interventions    49 
 
49 
ASEAN has been the most prominent among regional organizations in 
Asia. Informal arrangements centred on ASEAN but including states 
beyond its membership have become the preferred venue for discuss-
ing security issues in Asia. Significant among these is the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) which includes the 10 ASEAN members as well as 
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and 
the USA (thereby including all major powers of the Asia-Pacific). The 
same members also participate in the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8). Beyond these groupings is the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with those eighteen countries as well 
as Canada, the EU, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, with Papua New Guinea as an observer 
state. Both ADMM+8 and the ARF have explicit security agendas, 
although the EAS has a broader remit relating to multilateral coopera-
tion. These arrangements, particularly the ARF and EAS, have occa-
sionally been used by Western states to voice concerns over human 
rights issues in member states, particularly Myanmar and North Ko-
rea. 
 
An institution that could deal with security explicitly is also being set 
up. An ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) was 
originally mooted in 2009,90 and was formally proposed for estab-
lishment at the 18
th
 ASEAN Summit in May 2011. Recommendations 
were submitted to ASEAN ministers in November 2011 and March 
2012, with a view to establishing AIPR at the 2012 ASEAN Summit. 
AIPR is conceived as a network of think-tanks or second-track institu-
tions across the Southeast Asia region. The AIPR will allow a process 
where any conflict can be responded to through non-state mecha-
nisms.91 However, its scope and functions are yet to be established 
and agreement on the terms of reference has typically been slow. 
Developing a Regional Human Rights Architecture 
ASEAN has been primarily concerned with regional security ever 
since its inception, but the organization has also increasingly sought to 
develop a human rights role. As greater attention came to be placed on 
democratization and liberal governance by Western states in the post-
Cold War period, ASEAN members were often criticized for their 
human rights records. It was not until the signing of the ASEAN Char-
ter in 2007, however, that a human rights architecture in a meaningful 
sense started to take form. The ASEAN Charter of 2007 was signed 
after a consultative process involving an Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG) of senior officials from all member states. The EPG recognized 
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that ASEAN needed to move from being a diplomatic community to a 
‘people-centred organization’, and stated that this could not happen 
without the promotion of human rights. While primarily outlining the 
objective of a single market and ‘protection of the interests of con-
sumers in ASEAN’, it held that ASEAN’s objectives must include 
‘the strengthening of democratic values, ensuring good governance, 
upholding the rule of law, respect for human rights and international 
humanitarian law, and achieving sustainable development.’92 The 
ASEAN Charter thus states that the objective and purpose of ASEAN 
is, inter alia, ‘to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and 
the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and funda-
mental freedoms,’ (Art. 1(7)) and provides for the establishment of a 
regional human rights body under Article 14. 
 
The creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Hu-
man Rights (AICHR) in 2009 formalized the above-mentioned inten-
tions of the Charter and marked an important step towards the estab-
lishment of a regional human rights architecture. Whereas most insti-
tutional bodies relating to ASEAN had economic or security func-
tions, this was the first institution explicitly supporting a codification 
of norms set out in the ASEAN Charter. Moreover, it was set up pre-
cisely as a consultative body.93 In AICHR’s Terms of Reference a 
clear link is made between security and human rights, stating inter 
alia that its purpose is:  
 
To contribute to the realisation of the purposes of ASEAN as set out in the 
ASEAN Charter in order to promote stability and harmony in the region, friend-
ship and cooperation among ASEAN Member States, as well as the well-being, 
livelihood, welfare and participation of ASEAN peoples in the ASEAN Commu-
nity building process.94 
 
Arguably however, the contribution of human rights to security was 
not seen as a strong connection by the framers of the Charter and the 
AICHR Terms of Reference. Article 2 of the AICHR Terms of Refer-
ence, which quotes seven of fourteen ASEAN Charter Principles that 
as to guide AICHR, omits mention of Article 2(b) of the ASEAN 
Charter, which explicitly states a ‘shared commitment and collective 
responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
Unlike the ACHPR in Africa, the AICHR is tightly connected to 
ASEAN as an organization and its individual member states. The 
Commission consists of ten nationally-appointed commissioners, with 
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the Chairperson appointed from the nation that holds the ASEAN 
Chair. The Commission’s tasks include the promotion and protection 
of human rights, developing an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 
raising public awareness, capacity building for the implementation of 
human rights obligations, encouraging ASEAN member states to ac-
cede and ratify international human rights instruments, providing ad-
visory services and technical assistance to ASEAN sectorial bodies, 
engaging civil society, consulting national and international human 
rights bodies, developing common approaches and positions on hu-
man rights, and preparing studies on thematic issues of human rights. 
It is complemented by the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) and the 
ASEAN Committee on the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ACMW). 
 
AICHR and the sectorial bodies are bound by ASEAN institutional 
norms which specifically state that these entities will be guided by 
‘non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States’ 
and must have ‘respect for the right of every Member State to lead its 
national existence free from external interference, subversion and co-
ercion.’95 Observers have pointed out that the intrinsic function of a 
human rights body is to mediate between a state and its citizenry, yet 
the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty obstruct 
this very function.96 One ASEAN official has tried to reconcile these 
principles, stating ‘one must not read too much into the principle of 
‘non-interference’ (...) and overlook the principles of ‘shared com-
mitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, se-
curity and prosperity;’ (...) and ‘enhanced consultations on matters 
seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN’ (...), among oth-
ers. None of the 14 principles in Article 2 can be read exclusively; 
they should all be embraced and applied collectively.’97 In practice, 
however, the norms of non-interference and sovereignty have tended 
to take precedence, as will be seen from the case studies below.  
 
Civil society groups have requested that investigative powers be as-
signed to AICHR, but these do not exist in the current Terms of Ref-
erence. Thus, AICHR has no formal mechanism for receiving com-
plaints or allegations of human rights violations, even though it has 
already informally received cases for consideration.98 The ability to 
interpret its mandate more liberally is constrained by the need for con-
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sensus in the body. Some groups have also criticized the Commission 
for declining to meet with them, and for its general lack of engage-
ment with civil society.99 Despite efforts in 2010 and 2011, AICHR 
could not reach consensus on formal rules of procedure, eventually 
deeming the Terms of Reference to be sufficient. This has drawn fur-
ther criticism from rights groups. 
 
AICHR has also been criticized for its lack of transparency, having 
issued only short press releases of some meetings with no indication 
of decisions made; and while it is known to have a five-year work 
plan for 2010–2015, this has not been made public.100 However, 
AICHR has 10 commissioners, one from each of the ASEAN states, 
and their individual positions on human rights issues vary. Certain 
commissioners have been praised for being open and progressive, and 
appear willing to engage civil society in informal settings. The Com-
mission also has a five-year review clause in its Terms of Reference to 
allow for substantive changes, and thus has generally interpreted its 
first five years to focus on promotion rather than protection. 
 
Although AICHR has no formal relationship with national human 
rights commissions, it engages informally with them on an ad hoc ba-
sis. Originally, only four ASEAN states had national human rights 
structures (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). Since 
then, Myanmar has established a national human rights commission. 
Cambodia committed to establishing such an institution in 2006, but 
the procedure has remained stuck in the National Assembly, and civil 
society groups have voiced reservations about the efficacy of a nation-
al institution, as other human rights bodies already exist. 
 
Despite the lack of visible progress, there is tentative optimism with 
regard to the creation of AICHR and its possible impact on policies in 
the region. Informants for this study expressed sympathy with respect 
to the restrictions the body faced in its operations. Nevertheless, con-
cerns were voiced that AICHR will have to begin to move more firmly 
once the ASEAN human rights declaration is promulgated. As yet, 
AICHR is still in the process of starting its first thematic study, on 
corporate social responsibility and human rights in ASEAN. The pro-
cess of drafting the ASEAN human rights declaration is expected to 
be completed by the end of 2012. 
The drafting process of the human rights declaration has been con-
ducted in a closed manner by AICHR members, although a draft was 
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leaked early in 2012. The draft purported to show a considerable sec-
tion on limitations of rights as well as insertions or alternate proposals 
of various ASEAN countries. Following the leak, civil society groups 
became increasingly vocal in their condemnation of the process, con-
cerned that regressive legislation would seek to undermine human 
rights. A joint statement signed by over 130 civil society groups in the 
region called for the draft to be made public. It commended Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines for holding national consulta-
tions, but voiced concern that this had not been done in the other six 
ASEAN countries.101 Whereas ASEAN officials have stated that some 
form of consultations will take place, they have not set a date or 
agreed on the format. It is unclear how much public input will be tak-
en into consideration. This illustrates the tensions of ASEAN's inter-
nal practices, typically conducted by diplomats behind closed doors, 
and the expectations of civil society on issues they argue will have 
direct impacts on their communities.  
Case Studies 
Beyond these organizational impasses at the regional level, the follow-
ing case studies on Myanmar and southern Thailand illustrate the chal-
lenges to ASEAN in addressing regional conflict situations character-
ized by human rights abuses. The continued emphasis on non-
interference obstructs ASEAN and member states from responding to 
regional crises, both politically and on human rights grounds. Primacy 
over regional affairs is thus mainly threatened by external actors (the 
UN system, great powers) as there is no continent-level institution that 
would intervene within ASEAN states. Moreover, member states are 
few and, though politically diverse, committed to maintaining ASEAN 
and its institutional norms at the centre of their foreign policies. In the 
case of Myanmar, external pressures led member states to reassess 
their response. This conclusion is strengthened by the case of southern 
Thailand, which shows the preferred default posture of ASEAN and 
member states: deferring internal issues to the member state, regard-
less of that state’s role in exacerbating conflict. 
Authoritarianism in Myanmar 
Myanmar’s status as a pariah in the region developed as a result of the 
military’s authoritarian grip on the country from 1962, and whose in-
fluence continues today. Pro-democracy protests erupted in 1988 but 
were brutally suppressed. Nevertheless, the military promised elec-
tions in 1990; these were overwhelmingly won by the opposition Na-
tional League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The 
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military subsequently annulled the elections and continued to rule un-
til 2010, when it held its first elections in two decades. Under the mili-
tary’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC – later the 
State Peace and Development Council or SPDC), it suppressed politi-
cal activity and imprisoned political activists. It also continued to en-
gage in armed conflict with insurgent ethnic rebellions which began 
following independence and continued through the successive re-
gimes, moving from Communist-inspired revolts into ethnic conflicts. 
Democratization and liberalizing the political space thus became a 
central issue of improving the human rights situation in the country. 
 
ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar has proven a difficult and in 
many ways formative experience for the regional organization and its 
members. Despite Western sanctions on Myanmar after 1988, Thai-
land continued to maintain economic relations with the country, alleg-
edly allowing the junta’s forces to carry out operations against rebel 
groups within Thailand’s borders well into the 1990s. ASEAN’s in-
clusion of Myanmar in foreign relations and its subsequent acceptance 
into the organization took place against a complex political backdrop 
that would be definitive for its international standing. As Acharya 
writes: ‘The Burmese crisis unfolded at a time when human rights and 
democracy were emerging as a major issue in the relationship between 
the ASEAN members and their Western “dialogue partners”.’’102 He 
indicates that European and American sanctions and threats to extend 
these to the whole of ASEAN were interpreted as ‘interference’, mak-
ing any rejection of Myanmar a sign of caving to Western pressure. 
However, ASEAN had never stipulated rules on the nature of the po-
litical systems of its members. In 1997, and following the inclusion of 
Communist Vietnam, Myanmar joined, despite the country’s econom-
ic and political isolation by the West.  
 
The inclusion of Myanmar led ASEAN member states to seek to 
strengthen the primacy of the organization in the management of re-
gional security issues. In 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy was at-
tacked; this was widely thought to have been directed by military jun-
ta officials, sparking international condemnation. Following the inci-
dent, Thailand drafted a roadmap for democratization, forcing Myan-
mar’s hand and causing it to issue its own roadmap, in a remarkable 
playing out of Thai Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai’s observa-
tion that ‘ASEAN had to ‘play an increasingly creative role’ to avoid 
‘other groups tak[ing] up the issue and then order[ing] ASEAN to do 
as they say.’’103  
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Myanmar's 7-step roadmap – with no deadlines – became the guiding 
document for reforms and tracking progress of its democratization 
process. It involved reconvening the National Convention, drawing up 
a new constitution and holding a national referendum on it, followed 
by national elections and appointment of a representative leadership to 
carry out the new reforms. The pace of the roadmap reforms was slow, 
however, and set back by the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007, when 
Buddhist monks led a wave of protests against the regime. Then in 
May 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, causing devastation and 
drawing further criticism of the government for its sluggish response. 
(Surprisingly, the constitutional referendum went ahead, having start-
ed only days before Nargis hit.) 
 
In November 2010, Myanmar held general elections. Boycotted by the 
NLD, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the civil-
ian successor to the SPDC, won an overwhelming majority. The elec-
tions and the process leading up to them, as well as the first sitting of 
Myanmar’s new Hluttaw (the national convention, with a bicameral 
legislature), were widely criticized by Western observers as neither 
free nor fair.104 However, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house 
arrest immediately after the elections. Thein Sein, a former general 
and leader of the USDP, assumed the presidency in May, and held 
closed discussions with Suu Kyi in August. 
 
What happened next surprised nearly everyone – Thein Sein’s maiden 
speech to the Hluttaw on 22 August 2011 contained numerous refer-
ences to the need for good governance and reform in the country. 
Many might have dismissed these initially as a politically-correct ve-
neer for the tightly controlled reforms in the country,105 but a rapid set 
of changes followed – with a national human rights commission estab-
lished, a loosening of the country’s censorship laws, and the revoking 
of an agreement with China to build a controversial dam. Aung San 
Suu Kyi then pledged to work with the new government at the end of 
September, and the government in turn began the release of political 
prisoners and legalized the formation of unions and participation in 
strike action in October. By December 2011, it claimed to be negotiat-
ing ceasefires with the major insurgent groups in the country. The 
NLD was permitted to register; it ran in by-elections on 1 April 2012 
and won decisively, taking 43 of 46 available seats. Myanmar's re-
forms and political developments were at once praised by ASEAN and 
world leaders, but among Western leaders praise always came with 
the caveat that the reforms would have to be sustained and irreversible 
to demonstrate Myanmar’s commitment to real change. In November 
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at the ASEAN Summit, Myanmar was accepted to take the ASEAN 
Chairmanship in 2014, having been bypassed in 2005 over its human 
rights record. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Myanmar’s authoritarian rule sat uncomforta-
bly in ASEAN circles, even as questions were left unanswered as the 
Asian financial crisis hit and member-state priorities turned inward. 
The spillover effects of the junta’s political suppression led several 
countries to continue to voice concerns about Myanmar. As early as 
1992, Malaysia had been opposed to Myanmar membership, with 
some officials privately suggesting this was in response to persecution 
of the Rohingya Muslims, although Malaysia eventually became a 
supporter of Myanmar’s inclusion in ASEAN.106 Thailand, wary of 
the growing refugee numbers on its borders, also urged a policy of 
‘constructive engagement’ in 1991 (the term had earlier been used in 
the context of US foreign policy towards apartheid-era South Africa) 
that would encourage moderate reforms within the regime.107 
 
The Asian financial crisis wreaked havoc on Thailand and brought 
down the Chavalit government. New Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan 
urged ASEAN to adopt a new policy of ‘flexible engagement’, argu-
ing that ASEAN’s ‘cherished principle of non-intervention [should be] 
modified to allow ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or 
resolving domestic issues with regional implications.’108 An anteced-
ent of the responsibility to protect concept, flexible engagement em-
phasized ‘responsibilities for engagement, that is for contributing to 
the achievement of common regional goals and for managing bilateral 
differences or improving bilateral relations (sic).’109 Nevertheless the 
proposal was struck down, at least in name, and ‘constructive en-
gagement’ continued to be the preferred term for interactions with the 
junta. The demise of the ‘Asian values’ argument also meant less re-
sistance to external pressure. Moreover, ASEAN members were less 
ready to protect Myanmar from international sanctions as they found 
themselves preoccupied with tackling internal economic crises. 
 
With the situation in Myanmar unchanged, external pressure from the 
EU and the international community at large contributed to ASEAN 
member states softening their stance on non-interference. Despite a 
lack of apparent progress towards democratization or the improvement 
of human rights in the country, ASEAN officials claimed credit for 
slow reforms in Myanmar, and they were officially encouraged by the 
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ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) leaders.110 Overt criticism by 
ASEAN officials on the situation in Myanmar became increasingly 
the norm following well-publicized incidents in the country, such as 
the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy and the suppression of the 
2007 Saffron Revolution. Indeed the SPDC’s handling of this revolu-
tion, against a backdrop of stalled negotiations with the EU on an 
ASEAN-EU free trade agreement, led to calls by some ASEAN offi-
cials for the suspension of Myanmar from the organization.111 
 
The fallout from Cyclone Nargis also caused a fundamental shift. The 
scale of destruction and international attention put a great onus on the 
government of Myanmar to react more proactively, and on ASEAN 
states to assist. Initially, the government denied visas and access to 
non-resident international humanitarian agencies and Western naval 
assets to assist in the relief operations. This triggered a petition by 
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner to invoke the responsibil-
ity to protect (also known as R2P) as grounds for intervention, alt-
hough it was rejected on the grounds that the responsibility to protect 
was meant to be applicable only to genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, not natural disasters.112 ASEAN deployed its first Emergency 
Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) and devised a Post-Nargis Recovery 
and Preparedness Plan directly overseen by the Secretary-General, 
leading the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force. In 2007, ASEAN was 
pressed to condemn the crackdown of the Saffron Revolution after the 
UN Security Council and other international organizations had done 
so.113 
 
In the process of engaging Myanmar, ASEAN has come to recognize 
that there are limits to how states may behave, and that it must deal 
with the international community's tolerance towards certain kinds of 
behaviour, also human rights abuses that do not amount to atrocity 
crimes. ASEAN’s engagement in human rights discourse thus may 
have been necessary to demonstrate its willingness to be counted as 
responsible members of the international community.114  
This response clearly followed the lines known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, 
continuously emphasizing non-interference while simultaneously act-
ing in ways that might ordinarily be interpreted as interference. The 
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Chairman’s Statement of the 2010 East Asia Summit was illustrative 
of this contradictory stance: ‘We underscored the importance of na-
tional reconciliation in Myanmar and the holding of the elections in a 
free, fair, and inclusive manner, thus contributing to Myanmar’s sta-
bility and development.’115 In this sense, informal pressures were 
placed on Myanmar in order to avoid more overt forms of intervention 
or damaging the credibility of the grouping. Indonesia was especially 
proactive in pushing Myanmar on a reformist path, in part due to pres-
sure within its own parliament as a newly-democratic state seeking to 
exert its new vision in ASEAN.116 Nevertheless, until 2011, it was dif-
ficult to observe any impact from ASEAN’s overtures.  
 
Several geopolitical factors have been noted as underpinning the 
opening of the country: Its desire to assume the ASEAN Chairman-
ship in 2014, a reaction to the Arab Spring, and its need to counterbal-
ance China’s rapidly expanding influence in Myanmar with other in-
ternational actors. While China has been a strong ally of Myanmar, it 
was starting to be seen as too influential, and that led to the dramatic 
cancellation of large-scale infrastructure projects that had been pro-
vided with few conditions. The actual calculations leading to liberali-
zation by the previous military rulers are harder to determine; in the 
absence of strong indications of the reasons, this provides an interest-
ing scenario where everyone can now claim victory.117 
 
The clearest penalty Myanmar faced concerned the ASEAN Chair-
manship in 2005. Pressure was exerted by the USA and EU, and it 
was increasingly deemed untenable for Myanmar to be the interna-
tional face of the organization. Eventually, Myanmar offered to forego 
the Chair to concentrate on democratization, but only on the condition 
that it could take up the post whenever it was ready to do so. In 2011, 
Myanmar began to make strong overtures of seeking the 2014 Chair-
manship of ASEAN, finally granted in November 2011. After the 
signing of the ASEAN Charter (and the Saffron Revolution), Myan-
mar has not committed fresh reprisals or introduce harsher restrictions.  
These institutional commitments may well have led it to temper mas-
sive human rights abuses.118 
 
ASEAN’s promises to Myanmar to assume the ASEAN Chairmanship 
was not viewed necessarily as negative by civil society, and Aung San 
Suu Kyi has welcomed the move publicly. With a two-year horizon to 
taking the Chair, the presence of AICHR and the recent establishment 
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of a national human rights commission, Myanmar’s government is 
unlikely to want to give ASEAN political capital to revoke those cre-
dentials or encourage human rights investigations. ASEAN civil so-
ciety organizations working on Myanmar have also expressed the 
hope that, as ASEAN Chair, Myanmar will be forced to open up space 
for such organizations at sideline events such as the ASEAN People’s 
Assembly and the Heads of State meetings with civil society organiza-
tions. Myanmar’s democratization process is likely to be even more 
keenly observed than those of other states in the region, like Indonesia 
and the Philippines. The most optimistic hope that these processes 
may cause Myanmar to lead the grouping, from behind, on human 
rights, as in the case of the democratic change in Indonesia.119 
 
ASEAN has taken credit for continued engagement with Myanmar as 
the key to success in its opening up of the country – more concretely 
through repeatedly exposing its diplomats to the rapid economic de-
velopment of the region that Myanmar missed out on while in isola-
tion. This view is presented as opposing that of Western states who 
claim that the heavy costs of sanctions were the key, though the points 
are not as mutually exclusive as they may appear. While both explana-
tions are defensible, the detente between Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein 
Sein appears to be the key driving force in breaking the political dead-
lock. Neither ASEAN nor Western methods of pressure should be 
overplayed in terms of their contribution to resolving the crisis, inef-
fectual as both were for decades. 
 
What is significant is the way ASEAN and the West have interacted 
with each other over the issue. Despite criticism of their human rights 
records ASEAN states have enjoyed good economic relations with 
Western states since the end of the Cold War. The imperative behind 
stalling the EU-ASEAN free trade negotiations over Myanmar forced 
a change in posture by ASEAN towards one of outwardly condemning 
the junta, even if it had little impact on the junta itself at the time. It is 
also significant that these developments preceded the signing of the 
ASEAN Charter and establishment of AICHR, both of which have as 
yet had very little impact on ASEAN's approach to Myanmar. It could 
be argued that the preventive posture of these instruments influences 
the behaviour of the Myanmar government, but as yet there is little 
evidence of direct causation. 
Violent Conflict in southern Thailand 
Conflict in southern Thailand has old roots, but a very modern dimen-
sion. The conflict has been overlain with a range of discursive ele-
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ments such as self-determination, ethnic discrimination, religious ex-
tremism or jihad, as well as wars on terror or drugs. This mix of com-
peting and sometimes incommensurable narratives – explained 
through frameworks of grievance, ideology, politics, or criminality – 
has hindered clarity in policy responses. Actors on different sides have 
harnessed global and local discourses and networks to further their 
somewhat unclear goals.  
 
The conflict areas in southern Thailand consist of the Pattani,120 Yala, 
and Narathiwat provinces, while two other Malay-majority provinces 
of Songkhla and Satun have largely escaped the violence (although 
Hat Yai in Songkhla was bombed on 31 March 2012). The Muslim 
Patani kingdom was annexed by Siam in 1902, though it had come 
under the Thai sphere of influence as far back as 1768. Modern sepa-
ratism took on nationalist tones during successive waves of independ-
ence after World War II, with armed resistance developing in the 
1960s through separatist organizations such as the Barisan Nasional 
Pembebasan Patani (National Liberation Front of Patani or BNPP), 
the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolution Front or BRN) 
and the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). The region 
was also host to Communist guerrillas seeking refuge from Malaya, 
and divisions arose over the BRN’s support for the Communists, as 
well as internal divisions over the support for Malaysia or Indonesia 
during the Konfrontasi clashes in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
Analysts indicate three policy roots in current grievances that go back 
to the annexation of the Patani kingdom: these are the proscription of 
the use of the Malay language; the restriction of religious practices, 
particularly sharia law; and the regulation or policing of pondok or 
Islamic schools (madrassahs) by the central government.121 Others 
have characterized the tension as originally an ethnic Thai–Malay di-
vide that eventually took on aspects of religious (Buddhist–Muslim) 
cleavages.122 The troubled South nevertheless warranted a different 
approach, and in the 1990s the Thai government began a policy of Tai 
Rom Yen, or ‘South under a Cool Shade’, that attempted to introduce 
more holistic development policies for the impoverished area. Com-
bined with an amnesty programme, the policy gradually managed to 
erode popular support for the armed groups, several of which splin-
tered into smaller groups. Nevertheless, successive administrations 
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maintained uneven levels of commitment to the area as domestic polit-
ical turmoil led to a rapid succession of shifting regimes. 
 
Attacks on the police occurred at a low but consistent level from 2001 
onwards, though lack of an apparent political agenda behind the vio-
lence led then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to deny the role of 
religion, asserting that the violence was more likely associated with 
drug trafficking.123 Proximity to Myanmar’s drug triangle and low 
level of law enforcement made for a convincing narrative that eventu-
ally culminated in Thaksin’s ‘War on Drugs’ campaign in 2003. 
While this was not confined to the south, nearly 3,000 people were 
estimated to have been killed, mostly extra-judicially. This was seen 
as part of a major expansion in powers for the police and military. 
 
A separate trend at the national level was sparked by the US global 
push to fight a ‘War on Terror’ after the events of 9/11. The arrest of 
Ridduan Isamuddin (alias Hambali), a member the terrorist group 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Ayutthaya in 2003 provided the political im-
petus to pass emergency decrees on terrorism and money laundering 
after a previously non-committal stance towards the US-led War on 
Terror.124 Thai Muslims in the South protested the laws as undemo-
cratic, but the Constitutional Court ruled them constitutional in Febru-
ary 2004. 
 
Violence again escalated after a raid on an army camp in 2004 by 
armed gunmen. In contrast to earlier attempts to downplay the role of 
religious extremism, the January 2004 raid was well organized and 
immediately drew allegations that JI were behind the violence (a more 
recent raid on a base in Narathiwat in January 2011, however, was not 
connected to the global jihadist movement, despite showing high lev-
els of militant organization). Subsequent murders of Buddhist monks 
and students in 2004 led to martial law being imposed in the South 
even as the murders were condemned by Muslim and Buddhist com-
munities alike. Twin bombings on 31 March 2012 in Yala and Hat Yai 
reinforced the continuing if sporadic nature of the violence. 
 
The insurgents’ lack of a coherent front, the absence of demands and 
uncertain connections with terrorism or criminal elements have made 
this a difficult conflict to deal with, domestically or internationally. 
Because of its traditional animosity towards Bangkok, the region had 
been used as a refuge to other groups such as Communists and Islamic 
extremists. The political divisions among dissident groups are signifi-
cant: PULO was established by a descendant of the Patani Malay sul-
                                                 
123  BBC News (2002) "Thailand tackles violence in south, 11 July, Available at:". 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2120589.stm (accessed 13 February 2012).  
124  Chongkittavorn, K. (2004) "Thailand: International Terrorism and the Muslim South". 
Southeast Asian Affairs. p. 270. 
62 Andreas Stensland, Walter Lotze and Joel Ng  
tanate, while the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP, the suc-
cessor to the BNPP) is associated with local Malay elites, and the 
BRN and its offshoots have a much stronger grassroots base, perhaps 
learnt from their earlier association with Communist groups. There 
has thus never been consensus on the political aims among these dis-
contents. The only known initiative to merge the various groups oc-
curred in 1997 through an umbrella group known as Bersatu – but it 
failed, and there appears to be wariness of attempting such an endeav-
our again.125 
 
Furthermore, although the older groups of insurgents from the 1960s 
may provide moral leadership, they are unlikely to have direct com-
mand and control of the loose network of cadres involved in the cur-
rent wave of violence.126 Turbulent domestic politics, corruption and a 
policy of rotating regional commanders has also hampered relation-
ship-building on the government side, according to some inform-
ants.127 This combination of factors has complicated attempts at di-
plomacy, like those brokered by former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad in 2006, which proved inconclusive.  
 
The closest the southern conflict has come to getting on the regional 
agenda was when Malaysia and Indonesia sought to raise the issue at 
the 2005 ASEAN Summit. That prompted then Thai Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra to threaten to walk out. Eventually Malaysia is-
sued a watered-down statement of concern, and the issue did not re-
surface in 2005.128 Following ASEAN norms, the other member states 
have largely stayed aloof, except for some Malaysian and Indonesian 
officials typically working in unofficial capacities. Some observers 
feel that these discreet efforts have helped to keep space open for dis-
cussion and cooperation,129 but there is otherwise little to show. En-
gagement has been limited to bilateral talks through Malaysia, even as 
such interactions are coloured by local politics.130 
 
Malaysia has voiced human rights concerns in the context of Thai-
land’s heavy-handed approach to the conflict, but rarely with sus-
tained pressure or credibility for Bangkok. Malaysia’s role has often 
been distrusted, with numerous accusations over the years of harbour-
ing insurgents, or allowing insurgents with dual nationalities to avoid 
the Thai authorities. During the Cold War, the Malaysian government 
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had supported the insurgents in order to retain leverage against Thai-
land’s alleged support of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). 
However, Malaysian support waned after the CPM stood down in 
1989.131 There has been little spillover from the conflict, and that lim-
its the attention afforded to it by Malaysia, despite expressed sympa-
thies with their neighbours 
 
As long as ASEAN defers authority of the situation in southern Thai-
land to Bangkok, it is unlikely that its publicly-stated views will differ 
from the stance taken by the central government. Thailand has con-
sistently maintained that the conflict is an internal matter.132 Indeed, 
the main factors surrounding the conflict continue to be domestic, and 
in large degree dependent on the political situation in the Thai capital. 
Some have argued that the Thai military have sought to downplay the 
scale of the problem by ‘labelling it instead an inconvenient “law and 
order problem”.’133 Politics in Bangkok have not only led to an ad hoc 
or even incoherent approach to the region, but also overshadowed the 
south, whose issues are complex and difficult to define for the rest of 
the nation. 
 
There is little extra-regional pressure on ASEAN to resolve the situa-
tion or assume a more proactive role, despite the direct interest of no-
table ASEAN leaders in the area (such as Mahathir Mohamed or Surin 
Pitsuwan, who is a Muslim Thai). The conflict in southern Thailand 
serves as a stark contrast with Myanmar on the difference between 
necessary and sufficient conditions for regional focus to be brought to 
bear on a security issue with human rights dimensions. While abuses 
have been well-documented by human rights groups, they have rarely 
been sustained enough to attract international attention in the same 
way as those in Myanmar. Observers have remarked that the Thai 
press is itself complicit in covering the conflict superficially and 
avoiding discussing the root causes of the conflict.134  International 
human rights groups have reported consistently on the conflict, they 
enjoy little clout in the region and questionable impact beyond. 
 
ASEAN’s stance towards the southern Thailand problem may thus be 
inferred as a ‘default’ position with respect to human rights and secu-
rity, and an indicator of how the organization would respond in the 
absence of external pressure, cross-border spillover, or gross viola-
tions of human rights. Similar low-intensity problems relating to hu-
                                                 
131  Funston, J. (2010) "Malaysia and Thailand's southern conflict: reconciling security and 
ethnicity". Contemporary Southeast Asia.: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 
245-246. p. 58-59. 
132  Personal interview 14 (2011). Singapore.  
133  Liow, J. C. and D. Pathan (2010) "Confronting ghosts: Thailand’s shapeless southern 
insurgency". Lowy Institute Paper 30. p. 4.  
134  Thammasathien, N. (2010) "The Thai Press and the Southern Insurgency: Nothing More 
to Report". Contemporary Southeast Asia 32 (2).  
64 Andreas Stensland, Walter Lotze and Joel Ng  
man rights in Cambodia, Vietnam, Papua (Indonesia) and Mindanao 
(Philippines) have also received scant attention from the regional 
body. 
Observations 
ASEAN stands at an interregnum as its new institutions and legal per-
sonality emerge against the backdrop of a more globally open world. 
In recent years, ASEAN has been developing into a more robust re-
gional institution, where the development of a human rights architec-
ture is seen as a necessary stepping stone towards asserting primacy 
on regional relations. ASEAN’s current emphasis is to maintain its 
own centrality at the heart of Asian geopolitics, and it requires these 
normative frameworks to operate as the primary actor in this environ-
ment.135 However, the analysis of ASEAN responses – or lack of such 
– to regional conflict involving human rights violations reveals ten-
sions between the stated aspiration of member states and organiza-
tional practices. Several observations can be drawn in this regard. 
 
First, while current debates over human rights and security are now 
causing an institutional rethink,136 the development of legislation and 
enforcement mechanisms at the regional level can be characterized as 
sluggish. The forming of the ‘ASEAN Community’ plan has spurred 
the creation of new institutional structures, such as the ASEAN Inter-
governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and a human 
rights declaration. However, these developments are as yet in their 
infancy, still largely guided by old institutional practices of closed-
door negotiation, and traditional concepts of security and non-
interference. The ‘ASEAN Way’ that tends towards lowest-common-
denominator outcomes, and the practice of legislating behind imple-
mentation capacity, provides the basis of cooperation on future 
ASEAN conventions dealing with human rights. However, it is not 
only on the issue of human rights that the pace of reforms is slow. To-
day’s regional security architecture consists of a number of overlap-
ping but non-identical forums and meetings – the EAS, the ARF, 
APEC, and other regional groupings. While the emphasis on slow 
process and consensus is unlikely to change, an evolutionary legisla-
tive development may make it possible for member states to explore 
ways to link up the evolving human rights and security architectures 
of the region. As the Myanmar case study shows, it has become in-
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creasingly recognized that ASEAN’s stance on ‘non-interference’ is 
rather more fluid in practice than in rhetoric.137 
 
Second, external pressure on ASEAN members seems to have an ef-
fect on regional responses to conflict situations, but this can go both 
ways. Peer pressure and quiet diplomacy have often been used to ef-
fect changes in lieu of greater commitments to resolve threats to re-
gional security. However, the results are uneven: relatively successful 
cases like those of Aceh and Myanmar can be contrasted with unsuc-
cessful efforts, as in southern Thailand, southern Philippines or Papua. 
Interactions in the ASEAN–EU free trade negotiations and the per-
ceived inaction over Myanmar’s inaction over Cyclone Nargis seem to 
have contributed to ASEAN stepping up its pressure on Myanmar. 
Other regional forums, however, serve as more neutral settings where 
states under scrutiny are able to push back, often through reformula-
tions of ‘Asian values’ or by referring to the particularities of their na-
tional contexts (especially drawing on the language of ‘security’). Un-
derstanding the nature of institutional norms and regional security 
concerns that preceded the current commitment to human rights is vi-
tal to managing the tensions between ASEAN’s evolving regional 
human rights and security architectures. 
 
Third, the apparent lack of systematic consideration of security or 
human rights issues in regional forums may mean that certain security 
or human rights concerns can be overlooked, most notably conflicts 
like those in southern Thailand. Human rights abuses in Laos, Vi-
etnam and Cambodia have attracted far less attention than those of 
Myanmar, perhaps because these countries do not have a symbolic 
figure like Aung San Suu Kyi for political reform to coalesce around. 
This plays into claims that Western pressure is selective and indeed 
that ‘human rights is an easy, cheap, and popular way to exercise in-
fluence or maintain the illusion of involvement.’138 Forging stronger 
links between ASEAN’s nascent human rights architecture (AICHR) 
and regional forums may be one step in addressing the impression of 
uneven application. 
 
Fourth, the fact that AICHR is tightly connected to ASEAN and to its 
individual member states gives important political buy-in – but also 
weakens the potential role of the AICHR. As noted, AICHR consists 
of ten nationally-appointed commissioners, with the Chairperson ap-
pointed from the nation currently holding the ASEAN Chair. There is 
thus still scope to formalize limitations on the human rights norms be-
ing established in the region. Indications can be traced in the lack of 
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transparency surrounding the draft ASEAN human rights declaration, 
and the alleged inclusion of a section on the limitation of human 
rights. Simultaneously, the ostensibly liberal democratic states have 
been at the forefront of pushing for greater emphasis on rights-based 
approaches in policy, despite acknowledged problems within their 
borders. A key driver within ASEAN will be the newly-democratic 
and resurgent Indonesia, looking to re-establish a global footprint for 
itself. Democratic or liberalizing states within ASEAN, such as the 
Philippines and Thailand will be assertive allies. 
 
Fifth, the lack of inclusiveness in the development of ASEAN’s hu-
man rights architecture threatens to weaken the legitimacy of the re-
sulting instruments or declarations. ASEAN’s regional diplomacy has 
always been inclusive, yet it has not extended this principle of inclu-
siveness to its own civil society. On the other hand, it must also be 
recognized that ASEAN is a region of vast political and cultural diver-
sity, where instituting such changes or recognizing the value of these 
norms is difficult. Having until recently, lacked official consultations 
with a cross-section of civil society organizations in the region, there 
is a significant risk that they will reject the ASEAN human rights dec-
laration The AICHR’s recent commencement with civil society con-
sultations as of May 2012 are however a positive indication. If mo-
mentum can be sustained, this could provide a possibility for changing 
perceptions about the openness ASEAN has towards engaging with 
civil society. 
Conclusions 
How have regional human rights norms within the AU and ASEAN 
impacted on regional security discourse and practice? Because the 
human rights and security architectures were developed at separate 
times and to varying degrees in both organizations, the process of rec-
onciling them has proved cumbersome. This becomes particularly ev-
ident in instances where the organizations are faced with conflict situ-
ations involving wide-spread violations of human rights. The tensions 
that arise when balancing human rights and security concerns in these 
situations are not unique to AU and ASEAN. Rather, they are a regu-
lar – albeit not necessarily inevitable – consequence of weighing con-
cerns for stability against the rights of individuals. Based on the previ-
ous analysis, including case studies of AU and ASEAN crisis response 
in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Myanmar and southern Thailand, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 
While the nature and type of conflict situations facing the AU and 
ASEAN differ in important ways, there are strong similarities in how 
conflict situations are framed and responded to. Neither organization 
prefers to emphasize the human rights concerns arising out of conflict 
situations, but tend to frame conflicts and their solutions as primarily 
political in nature, and address human rights concerns under the rubric 
of ‘political engagement’, as opposed to utilizing a more strongly in-
terventionist approach. Whereas the AU seems to legislate ahead of its 
capacity to implement decisions taken by member states to develop 
ambitious human rights and security architectures, ASEAN has moved 
more cautiously, legislating only as far as its capacity to implement 
allows. Nevertheless, their capacity to deal with the tensions at the 
nexus between regional human rights and security architectures will 
be central to their future ability to develop responses to conflict within 
member states.  
 
When responding to regional crisis involving human rights abuses, the 
AU and ASEAN must increasingly compete with a range of actors 
(external, sub-regional, emerging powers and civil society). Both or-
ganizations will have to pay greater attention to the nexus between 
regional human rights and security architectures if they are to maintain 
their legitimacy as primary actors in their regions, and if they wish to 
continue to guard against external interference. Hence, both organiza-
tions need to further investigate the roles and responsibilities assigned 
to their human rights and security institutions and decision-making 
bodies. In particular, the ways in which these institutions and organs 
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are to relate to one another as regards decision-making, must be priori-
tized and further investigated if they are to avoid procedural stove-
piping and successfully address conflict situations in their regions. 
 
The AU has a relatively robust human rights and security architecture 
in place on paper. In practice, however, these have not been able to 
interact in the manner envisioned in policy frameworks. It remains to 
be seen whether and how this challenge can be addressed by the re-
cently launched African Governance Architecture and the African 
Human Rights strategy.
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 If it wishes to avoid developing paper ti-
gers, ASEAN can draw valuable lessons from the AU in this regard, in 
particular as it further develops its own human rights and security ar-
chitectures. 
 
The human rights architecture in the AU – the ACHPR in particular – 
is detached from member-state influence. An important task for the 
future will therefore be to increase member state’s interest in the work 
of the ACHPR – something that requires greater ownership and 
acknowledgement. The danger is that member states might seek to 
make the ACHPR less intrusive, as opposed to working towards fur-
ther empowering the Commission, not least in response to the asser-
tiveness of the Commission and the Court in the Libyan case. In 
Southeast Asia, AICHR’s close connection to ASEAN and to the in-
dividual member states provides important political buy-in, but also 
weakens the independent role of the AICHR and may curb the access 
of and interaction with civil society and regional/national human 
rights NGOs. 
 
It is important to further empower independent organs that can influ-
ence the work of the organizations and member states, such as the 
ACHPR and the African Court in Africa, and civil society organiza-
tions and – potentially – the AIPR in Southeast Asia. The ACHPR and 
the African Court still suffer from a lack of political will on the part of 
member states. Encouraging a judicial identity and creating a space 
for ambitious and creative judges and commissioners can prove cen-
tral for further developing the African human rights architecture, and 
for setting a new pace for the entrenchment of human rights on the 
continent. This process could generate important insights for ASEAN, 
as it seeks to develop the AICHR, the AIPR and the regional human 
rights declaration and works to further develop its regional human 
rights architecture. 
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If the AU and member states cannot find a meaningful way of ad-
dressing these tensions, through existing legislation, institutions and 
political mechanisms, they are likely to face similar challenges when 
responding to future conflict situations characterized by human rights 
violations. Under such circumstances, the legitimacy and credibility of 
the AU may be further questioned – not only by the international 
community, but also by member states. Indeed, the AU might find it-
self bypassed by other actors. By contrast, the nature of conflict in 
Southeast Asia is less acute, more structural in nature and more sub-
dued. This heightens the threshold for external interference in 
ASEAN’s responses – or lack of such – to regional conflict situations. 
In the development of stronger human rights architecture, old practic-
es still create impasses and slow down the processes, but the rise of 
democratic member states, Indonesia in particular, may create promis-
ing dynamics in the future. 
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